Cognitive-Phenomenological Penetration

Hypothesis 1 (1) (2014)
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Abstract

The study of the mind has to grapple with both the unconscious and the conscious. While the phenomenon of cognitive penetration has already been explored especially in connection to the modularity of perceptual and cognitive processes, the phenomenon of cognitive-phenomenological penetration, the penetration within the stream of consciousness of the phenomenological fabric of experiences by the phenomenology of thought, has not been given much attention thus far. In this paper, I focus with analytic-phenomenological methods on cognitive-phenomenological penetration as a phenomenon whereby the texture of non-cognitive phenomenologies gets modified by cognitive phenomenologies. I present a metaphysical model of cognitive-phenomenological penetration and argue that it can be used to support a non-modular view in the metaphysics of the conscious and unconscious mind, to confirm the hypothesis that there exists a sui generis phenomenology of thought, and to defend the view that cognitive-phenomenological penetration has a pivotal role to play in appraisals of rationality, irrationality, and cognitive distortions at the intrasubjective, intersubjective, and extra-mental levels.

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Identity and Discrimination.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Motor Cognition: What actions tell the self.Marc Jeannerod - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 174--196.

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