Structures of Normative Theories

The Monist 76 (1):22-40 (1993)
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Abstract

Normative theorists like to divide normative theories into classes. One special point of focus has been to place utilitarianism into a larger class of theories which do not necessarily share its view about what is alone of impersonal intrinsic value, namely, individual human well-being, but do share another structural feature, roughly its demand that each person seek to maximize the realization of what is of impersonal intrinsic value. The larger class is distinguished from its complement in two apparently different ways. Let us look briefly at these two ways.

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James Dreier
Brown University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Rights and agency.Amartya Sen - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1):3-39.
Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.Roderick Firth - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser, Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.

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