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Epistemological observations about mind-machine equivalence
Abstract
One of the highly contraversial discussions in philosophy of mind is equivalence of human being mind and machines. Here we show that no one could prove that, in certain he is a machine.Author's Profile
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Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
Are you a machine?: the brain, the mind, and what it means to be human.Eliezer J. Sternberg - 2007 - Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books. Edited by Shannon Balke.
The ontological argument against the mind-machine hypothesis.Beth Preston - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (2):131-57.
On Fodor's distinction between strong and weak equivalence in machine simulation.A. Rosenberg & N. J. Mackintosh - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (March):118-120.
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
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