Meta-fictionalism about the non-present

Synthese 202 (5):1-13 (2023)
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Abstract

Presentists deny that past or future things exist. Some presentists also deny that there are any underlying truths about the past or future. While this seems to conflict with our everyday tensed discourse, presentists might avoid conflict by adopting a theory of hermeneutic fictionalism about the non-present. Under such a theory, everyday utterances of non-present-tensed sentences are taken to engage with a fiction, rather than expressing truths about the past or future. In this paper I defend a specific version of this view: meta-fictionalism about the non-present. Under this view there is a socially-understood non-present fiction, a 'story of history', derived from apparent records existing in the present. Meta-fictionalists take our everyday tensed discourse to involve assertions about the content of that fiction. I argue that this view is plausible, and that it fares better than pretence fictionalism, a competing view that has already seen discussion in the literature.

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Patrick Dawson
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Free will expressivism.Kristie Miller - 2025 - Synthese 206 (1):1-28.
Presentism.David Ingram & Jonathan Tallant - 2026 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Presentism.David Ingram & Jonathan Tallant - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Go figure: A path through fictionalism.Stephen Yablo - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):72–102.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.
Hermeneutic fictionalism.Jason Stanley - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.

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