Colour Relations in Form

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):574-594 (2020)
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Abstract

The orthodox monadic determination thesis holds that we represent colour relations by virtue of representing colours. Against this orthodoxy, I argue that it is possible to represent colour relations without representing any colours. I present a model of iconic perceptual content that allows for such primitive relational colour representation, and provide four empirical arguments in its support. I close by surveying alternative views of the relationship between monadic and relational colour representation.

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Author's Profile

Will Davies
University of Oxford

References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
An essay concerning human understanding.John Locke - 1975 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Peter Nidditch.
Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.

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