Abstract

In The Brain Abstracted, Chirimuuta argues against the “literal interpretation” of computational models. The literal interpretation understands computational models as providing true descriptions of neural processes. According to Chirimuuta, the literal interpretation involves endorsing the computationalism thesis and adopting a theory of computational implementation. The connection between these views, Chirimuuta argues, is what forces the computationalist to reckon with two significant metaphysical problems, what I call the "problem of implementation" and the "problem of multiple realizability." Here, I examine the connections between the various views that Chirimuuta considers, and I argue that one who endorses computationalism can avoid both metaphysical problems. I do this by distinguishing computationalism from the literal interpretation and the implementation of computational models in neuroscience. Although this engages with Chirimuuta's project directly, it is helpful for those who wish to make sense of the intricacies of the computationalism thesis and computational functionalism.