Nominalism, Trivialist Platonism and Benacerraf's dilemma

Analysis 74 (2):224-231 (2014)
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Abstract

In his stimulating new book The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo offers a new account of mathematics, which he calls ‘Trivialist Platonism’. In this article, we take issue with Rayo’s case for Trivialist Platonism and his claim that the view overcomes Benacerraf’s dilemma. Our conclusion is that Rayo has not shown that Trivialist Platonism has any advantage over nominalism.

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Author Profiles

Chris Daly
University of Manchester
David Liggins
University of Manchester

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References found in this work

Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
The Construction of Logical Space.Agustín Rayo - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.

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