Abstract

In my Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being, I have argued that Heidegger's philosophizing about Being stumbles upon a contradiction (i.e., the first claim) and that he takes such a contradiction to be true (i.e., the second claim). Many interpreters have, however, resisted my interpretation by denying that Heidegger faces the contradiction in question. In this paper, I discuss the three ways I have employed in order to show that Heidegger faces a contradiction in philosophizing about Being, and I outline their main criticisms as well. After that, I develop a fourth and novel way, which shows that the principle of sufficient reason plays a unique role in retrieving a contradiction in Heidegger's understanding of Being. To conclude, I show that this fourth way is not vulnerable to the criticisms moved again the other three and, for this reason, my first claim remains cogent.