Explaining Qualia: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Abstract

The enigma of consciousness, particularly the subjective and ineffable nature of qualia (our inner conscious experience), poses one of the most challenging puzzles in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science—the "hard problem". Grounded in interdisciplinary perspectives from philosophy of mind and neuroscience, this article introduces a novel theoretical framework aimed at elucidating the mysterious nature of qualia and providing a comprehensive explanation for the hard problem of consciousness. Emphasizing the intricate relationship between consciousness, identity, and subjective experience, and analyzing the brain's “atomic nature”, the proposed model challenges reductionist perspectives that solely attribute consciousness to brain function. Here, the role of identity is integrated, emphasizing its centrality in comprehending conscious phenomena. Rejecting simplistic views equating brain states with mental states, the proposed framework also questions exclusive reliance on information integration theories. The suggested model contends that subjective experience transcends corresponding brain activity, introducing a dualistic perspective that involves non-physical information. The uniqueness of human consciousness is underscored, contrasting it with artificial intelligence, and highlighting it as vital for sustaining emotions, genuine comprehension, and engaging in complex behaviors. The paper advocates for a holistic perspective that recognizes the non-material dimension of consciousness, emphasizing its pivotal role in shaping human experience and behavior. This integrative approach seeks to contribute to both theoretical discourse and empirical investigations, fostering a deeper understanding of the nature of qualia and consciousness.

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127):127-136.

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