Choice Points for a Modal Theory of Disjunction

Topoi 36 (1):171-181 (2017)
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Abstract

This paper investigates the prospects for a semantic theory that treats disjunction as a modal operator. Potential motivation for such a theory comes from the way in which modals embed within disjunctions. After reviewing some of the relevant data, I go on to distinguish a variety of modal theories of disjunction. I analyze these theories by considering pairs of conflicting desiderata, highlighting some of the tradeoffs they must face.

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Fabrizio Cariani
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals.Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (2):475-511.
Free choice and homogeneity.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Semantics and Pragmatics 12:1-48.
Free choice reasons.Daniel Bonevac - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):735-760.

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References found in this work

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson, Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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