11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:309 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 309–320.
What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel, ‘Knowledge as a Mental State’.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 309-320.
Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?Patrick Rysiew - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 333-344.
Knowledge, Causal Explanation, and Teleology.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 321-332.
Mindreading Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-94.
Teadmise märgid ja skeptiline väljakutse: intervjuu Jennifer Nageliga.Bruno Mölder - 2021 - Studia Philosophica Estonica:50-61.
13. Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?Patrick Rysiew - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:333-343.
Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study.Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & John Waterman - 2014 - In James R. Beebe, Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 97-117.
Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-17

Downloads
160 (#260,408)

6 months
16 (#744,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Photo of Stephen Andrew Butterfill
Stephen Andrew Butterfill
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes).Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1461-1481.
Young children's conceptions of knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references