Sexism, ageism, racism, and the nature of consciousness

Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):39-70 (1999)
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Abstract

If a philosophical theory led to the conclusion that the red stripes cannot look red to both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old, we would be reluctant (to say the least) to accept that philosophical theory. But there is a widespread philosophical view about the nature of conscious experience that, together with some empirical facts, suggests that color experience cannot be veridical for both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old.

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Ned Block
New York University

Citations of this work

Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Rethinking naive realism.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):607-633.

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References found in this work

The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (7):357-381.
The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationism.Mark Johnston - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright, Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130.
Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception.Evan Thompson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):339-343.
Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert, Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

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