Abstract

Some have argued that animals pose a problem for substance dualism. Across the animal kingdom we find gradual, continuous development of mental capacities, so any suggestion of a sharp dividing line between creatures with and without immaterial minds seems arbitrary. This paper aims to resolve this problem by distinguishing its two aspects: the problem of diverse mental capacities and the problem of vagueness. With respect to the former, it is argued that the best dualist accounts of embodiment in the human case already imply that mental capacities correlate with neural complexity. The implication of vast unexercised capacities in lower animals can be avoided if we allow that minds or souls can differ in their capacities. With respect to the problem of vagueness, the paper points out that the vagueness of consciousness is contested, and defending it comes at the cost of precluding the identification of any particular instance of a borderline case. Therefore, there is no reason to think there are borderline conscious animals. Taken together, these responses aim to resolve dualism’s animal problem.