Cognitive impenetrability, phenomenology, and nonconceptual content

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):367-368 (1999)
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Abstract

This commentary discusses Pylyshyn's model of perceptual processing in the light of the philosophical distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual content of perception. Pylyshyn's processing distinction maps onto an important distinction in the phenomenology of visual perception.

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10.1017/s0140525x99232025

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Jose Luis Bermudez
Texas A&M University

Citations of this work

Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: A dilemma.Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.
[no title].Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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