Abstract

Respecting individual liberty is a foundational principle of both liberal democratic theory and public health ethics. It is not always clear, however, what role liberty should play in evaluating restrictive public health policies such as those implemented by governments during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, a number of scholars argued that an appeal to individual liberty provides a strong argument against restrictive policies such as stay-at-home orders, school and business closures, and gathering restrictions—which we will collectively refer to as “lockdowns.” This paper argues, by contrast, that the liberty-based arguments against lockdowns are inconclusive or incomplete. While individual liberty is an important consideration, it does not, on its own, provide a strong argument against pandemic lockdowns. To show as much, we survey some of the most promising and prominent liberty-based arguments against lockdowns. We argue that such arguments either fail or are incomplete. Before concluding, we draw on this discussion to suggest a different liberty-based frame for evaluating pandemic policies. This approach would focus more on what functions liberties are meant to fulfill and whether lockdowns can be designed to preserve those functions—even if they restrict liberty.