“Tätigsein und die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the first-person perspective)

In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier, Was sind menschliche Personen?: Ein akttheoretischer Zugang. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter (2008)
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Abstract

It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds of first-person perspectives. On the one hand, all persons are agents, but not all agents are persons; on the other hand, all moral agents are persons, but not all persons are moral agents.

Other Versions

edition Rudder Baker, Lynne (2008) "Tätigsein und die Erste-Person-Perspektive". In Niederbacher, Bruno, Runggaldier, Edmund, Was sind menschliche Personen?: Ein akttheoretischer Zugang, pp. 55-78: De Gruyter (2008)

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Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas, Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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