Abstract

According to Noë’s perspectivism, the basic objects of perceptual experiences are perspectival properties of a scene, rather than their actual properties. This concept of perspectivism shares a same core with sense datum theory. The core is the result of Noë’s accepting sense datum theory’s main idea: perspectival properties are perceptually basic. However, Noë, by fundamental modification of perspectival properties, tries to secure his theory against certain problems of sense datum theory. Although, according to sense datum theory, objects of perception are subjective, Noë’s perspectival properties are objective. I argue that the modification is not enough. Inferring “I see perspectival properties of a scene” from “I see the scene from a certain perspective” is not necessarily true. Furthermore, the perspectivism is inconsistent with ordinary phenomenology of perceptual experience. In common perceptual experiences, it is not the case that perspectival properties are always seen. But they are eventually recognized with focus and practice. At the end, empirical evidences refute Noë’s perspectivism.