We are currently experiencing technical difficulties. Some features may not work well or at all. Please bear with us as we are working hard to restore full service.

Laughing with Self as Other: From Homo ridens to Homo risibilis

In The Palgrave Handbook of the Philosophy of Humor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 909-940 (2026)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter describes the move from one resilient tradition in the philosophy of laughter, Homo ridens, or the laughing human being, to a newer tradition, Homo risibilis, or the ridiculous human being. Born from the former’s laugh at the other, Homo risibilis latter needs nurturing because it is predicated on referring that laughter to one's self, first, and then embracing in it the entire human condition. After describing each tradition of laughter, also in their relations to neighboring views, this chapter examines the viability, prevalence, and desirability of self-referential laughter. It tracks its presence in philosophers of laughter through a logic of laughing which discloses that, usually after a metanoia or change of heart from the tragic to the comic, laughing at the other may be reoriented towards self-referential laughter; and, by repeating the movement that associates laughing at another with laughing at self, the other is seen as one’s self, and one’s self as another, which enables us to abide in perpetual cheerfulness.Finally, this chapter introduces a comprehensive philosophy, Homo risibilis, which by the sole use of self-referential laughter grants the highest benefits, both epistemological and emotional: rather than laughing at the other, Homo risibilis indicates how to laugh with, rather than at, oneself, as if one were another.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-04-17

Downloads
4 (#2,256,956)

6 months
4 (#1,747,044)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references