Transitive inference in animals: Reasoning or conditioned associations?

In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds, Rational Animals? Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2006)
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Colin Allen
University of California, Santa Barbara

Citations of this work

Health, Agency, and the Evolution of Consciousness.Walter Veit - 2022 - Dissertation, The University of Sydney
A property cluster theory of cognition.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-30.
Methods in Comparative Cognition.Marta Halina - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?Jacob Beck - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.

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