Causality and Human Freedom in Malebranche

Philosophy and Theology 9 (3-4):321-331 (1996)
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Abstract

In that it holds God to be the only true efficient cause, Malebranche’s occasionalism would seem to deny human freedom and to make God responsible for our sins. I argue that Malebranche’s occasionalism must be considered within its Cartesian framework; once one understands what it is to be an occasional cause in this context, Malebranche can be seen as saving a place for human freedom, and he can consistently hold that we are morally responsible for our actions.

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Fred Ablondi
Hendrix College

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