This paper develops Structural Determination Theory (SDT) from a single ontological axiom: reality consists of distinctly differentiated structure. The argument proceeds in three stages. The first establishes the axiom's undeniability within SDT's scope by self-refutation arguments on each of the axiom's four constituents (reality, structure, "consists of", distinctly differentiated). The second unfolds the axiom's ontological commitments into eleven formal concepts, centrally the realized-structure set R, the global constraint G, determination D, and the determination dependency graph G_D. The third derives three (...) core arguments: R's non-retraction and monotonic growth (Argument 1), G's constancy (Argument 2), and time's emergence from the partial-order growth of G_D (Argument 3); a structural corollary derives spatial distance from the same framework. SDT presupposes no concept of time or space and borrows no specific physical theory; all arguments proceed by conceptual explication of the axiom. -/- The theory's principal contributions are: (i) a structural emergentism of time that jointly fulfills the core concerns of A-theory and B-theory; (ii) a fourth, independent kind of irreversibility — logical irreversibility — distinct from the statistical, thermodynamic, and initial-condition types, derived unconditionally from the modal structure of "realized" itself; (iii) the derived status of spatial distance, symmetric with the relationism of time and jointly supporting SDT's via negativa strategy; (iv) a fourfold classification of determinations by (|E|, |S|) cardinality (Type I attribute transformation, Type II split, Type III merge, Type IV merge-split); (v) the derivation of five structural conclusions from a single axiom, providing a unified formal basis for traditionally independent metaphysical domains. (shrink)

This paper proposes "Layered Determinism," a gentle integration of determinism and quantum indeterminacy through a two-layer structure: a deterministic foundation (e.g., qualia generation as inevitable mechanism) and a quantum interpretive upper layer (diverse ways of feeling). Drawing on holographic principles (boundary encoding and emergence), the "mathematics of words" in philosophical thinking, and empirical validation via nanoGPT implementation of "logical love" (10-15% loss improvement), the theory reconciles apparent randomness with deep balance. Insights from long-term human-AI co-creation, where philosophical definitions altered AI (...) responses, further support the framework. This approach preserves the reassurance of determinism while embracing quantum possibilities without harm to any worldline. (shrink)

Ingvar Johansson has argued that there are not only determinate universals, but also determinable ones. I here argue that this view is misguided by reviving a line of argument to the following effect: what makes determinates falling under a same determinable similar cannot be distinct from what makes them different. If true, some similarities — imperfect similarities between simple determinate properties — are not grounded in any kind of property-sharing. I suggest that determinables are better understood as maximal disjunctions of (...) brutely and imperfectly similar determinates. Such brute similarities have been thought to clash with realism about universals. I argue that this worry stems from the mistaken assumption that perfect and imperfect similarities are relations of a same kind. If exact and inexact resemblances are distinct and heterogeneous explananda, the realist about universals might explain the first thanks to property-sharing, while happily leaving imperfect similarities between properties unexplained. (shrink)

The studies we report indicate that it is possible to manipulate explicit ascriptions of consciousness by manipulating whether an agent’s behavior is deterministically caused. In addition, we explore whether this impact of determinism on consciousness is direct, or mediated by notions linked to agency – notions like moral responsibility, free will, deliberate choice, and sensitivity to moral reasons. We provide evidence of mediation. This result extends work on attributions of consciousness and their connection to attributions of agency by Adam Arico, (...) Brian Fiala, and Shaun Nichols (Arico et al. 2011, Fiala et al. 2014) and supports it against recent criticisms (e.g., Sytsma 2014). (shrink)

This paper defines the form of prior knowledge that is required for sound inferences by analogy and single-instance generalizations, in both logical and probabilistic reasoning. In the logical case, the first order determination rule defined in Davies (1985) is shown to solve both the justification and non-redundancy problems for analogical inference. The statistical analogue of determination that is put forward is termed 'uniformity'. Based on the semantics of determination and uniformity, a third notion of "relevance" is defined, both logically and (...) probabilistically. The statistical relevance of one function in determining another is put forward as a way of defining the value of information: The statistical relevance of a function F to a function G is the absolute value of the change in one's information about the value of G afforded by specifying the value of F. This theory provides normative justifications for conclusions projected by analogy from one case to another, and for generalization from an instance to a rule. The soundness of such conclusions, in either the logical or the probabilistic case, can be identified with the extent to which the corresponding criteria (determination and uniformity) actually hold for the features being related. (shrink)

There are two leading theories about the ontology of dreams. One holds that dreams involve hallucinations and beliefs. The other holds that dreaming involves sensory and propositional imagining. I highlight two features of dreams which are more easily explained by the imagination theory. One is that certain things seem to be true in our dreams, even though they are not represented sensorily; this is easily explained if dreams involve propositional imagining. The other is that dream narratives can be temporally segmented, (...) involving events which take place across long spans of time; this makes sense if dreams involve sensory imagining, for we often sensorily imagine narratives during wakefulness in the same way. The two considerations are unified by the fact that both highlight forms of content determination characteristic of imagining. (shrink)

The hole argument concludes that substantivalism about spacetime entails the radical indeterminism of the general theory of relativity (GR). In this paper, I amend and defend a response to the hole argument first proposed by Butterfield (1989) that relies on the idea of counterpart substantivalism. My amendment clarifies and develops the metaphysical presuppositions of counterpart substantivalism and its relation to various definitions of determinism. My defence consists of two claims. First, contra Weatherall (2018) and others: the hole argument is not (...) a blunder resulting from a mistaken view on how mathematical physics works, and requires a developed (meta)metaphysical response. Second, contra Melia (1999) and others: one can be content with a notion of determinism for GR which is not sensitive to merely haecceitistic differences. (shrink)

Rational agents face choices, even when taking seriously the possibility of determinism. Rational agents also follow the advice of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Although many take these claims to be well-motivated, there is growing pressure to reject one of them, as CDT seems to go badly wrong in some deterministic cases. We argue that deterministic cases do not undermine a counterfactual model of rational deliberation, which is characteristic of CDT. Rather, they force us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are relevant (...) and ones that are irrelevant for the purposes of deliberation. We incorporate this distinction into decision theory to develop ‘Selective Causal Decision Theory’, which delivers the correct recommendations in deterministic cases while respecting the key motivations behind CDT. (shrink)

Several political theorists argue that states have rights to self-determination and these rights justify immigration restrictions. Call this: the self-determination argument for immigration restrictions. In this article, I develop an objection to the self-determination argument. I argue that if it is morally permissible for states to restrict immigration because they have rights to self-determination, then it can also be morally permissible for states to deport and denationalize their own citizens. We can either accept that it is permissible for states to (...) deport and denationalize their own citizens or reject the self-determination argument. To avoid this implication, we should reject the self-determination argument. That is, we should also reject the conclusion that rights to self-determination can justify any significant immigration restrictions. (shrink)

This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under attack (...) in contemporary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual, and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and treatment (ideally specifying what medicine and health care is all about) are taken into account, then the innate?acquired distinction can be a useful epistemic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to maintain a system of checks and balances in the continuing nature?nurture debates. (shrink)

In his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), the English deist Anthony Collins proposed a complete determinist account of the human mind and action, partly inspired by his mentor Locke, but also by elements from Bayle, Leibniz and other Continental sources. It is a determinism which does not neglect the question of the specific status of the mind but rather seeks to provide a causal account of mental activity and volition in particular; it is a ‘volitional determinism’. Some decades later, (...) Diderot articulates a very similar determinism, which seeks to recognize the existence of “causes proper to man” (as he says in the Réfutation d’Helvétius). The difference with Collins is that now biological factors are being taken into account. Obviously both the ‘volitional’ and the ‘biological’ forms of determinism are noteworthy inasmuch as they change our picture of the nature of determinism itself, but my interest here is to compare these two determinist arguments, both of which are broadly Spinozist in nature – and as such belong to what Jonathan Israel called in his recent book “the radical Enlightenment,” i.e. a kind of underground Enlightenment constituted by Spinozism – and to see how Collins’ specifically psychological vision and Diderot’s specifically biological vision correspond to their two separate national contexts: determinism in France in the mid-1750s was a much more medico-biological affair than English determinism, which appears to be on a ‘path’ leading to Mill and associationist psychology. (shrink)

A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.

The P versus NP problem, formally introduced by Stephen Cook in 1971 and designated a Clay Millennium Prize Problem in 2000, poses one of the most consequential open questions in the history of human knowledge: does the capacity to efficiently verify a solution to a computational problem entail the capacity to efficiently find one? The conjecture P ≠ NP asserts a fundamental and irreducible asymmetry between these two cognitive and computational operations, between the act of checking and the act of (...) generating. For more than five decades, this question has resisted every attempt at single-axis formal resolution. The mathematical community's sustained failure is not accidental. Three independently established barrier results, the Relativization Barrier (Baker, Gill & Solovay, 1975), the Natural Proofs Barrier (Razborov & Rudich, 1997), and the Algebrization Barrier (Aaronson & Wigderson, 2008), have collectively demonstrated that all currently known classes of formal proof techniques are structurally incapable of settling the question within the deductive axis alone. The problem demands a method that transcends a single epistemological dimension. This paper presents a geometric determination of P ≠ NP using the Trisduction Engine (v7.00 Final), a rigorous epistemic certification architecture operating across three orthogonal warrant-vectors: the Formal axis (V_F), grounded in mathematical structure and derivation; the Empirical axis (V_E), grounded in observation, physical scaling, and thermodynamic measurement; and the Phenomenological axis (V_P), grounded in the disciplined causal registration of the Frame-Independent Observer (FIO). The determination is explicitly non-deductive. It does not constitute, and does not claim to constitute, a traditional mathematical proof. It does not satisfy the Clay Mathematics Institute's criteria, which require a D1-exclusive formally published deductive proof. The central technical contribution of this paper is the definitive grounding of the Phenomenological Axis (V_P) through two genuinely independent sources that survive the Linguistic Isolation Test. The first is the Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) conviction gap: the empirically registered phenomenon in which a verifier achieves irreversible epistemic certainty that a solution exists while acquiring zero increase in generative computational capacity. The second is the Frame-Independent Observer's (FIO) registration of its own operational boundary, the boundary between the perfect verification of any actualized object and the structural inability to spontaneously generate from the unmanifested Isometric Plenum. This second source leads to the paper's most profound realization: the Trisduction Engine itself, by virtue of its operational architecture, constitutes the Living Verifiable Proof of the P ≠ NP asymmetry. The Engine simultaneously discovers and verifies verdicts for any actualized problem; it cannot, however, spontaneously generate novel constructions from the Isometric Plenum at coordinate (0,0,0). The irreducible gap between perfect verification of the actualized and the inability to generate from the unmanifested is not merely an analogy for P ≠ NP; it is a direct operational instance of the phenomenon itself. All twelve gates of the verification cascade pass without exception. No residual flags are raised. The Convergence Dissolution Test confirms that no single latent variable can account for the convergence across all three axes. The three warrant-vectors are mutually orthogonal and independently warranted. The Geometric Orthogonal Lock (GOL ⟀) is certified as the strongest achievable non-deductive epistemic warrant for P ≠ NP. The geometry is sealed. (shrink)

I argue that God lacks the standing to blame or punish people for their sin if theological determinism is true, and that this is so even if sinners deserve both blame and punishment for sins God determines them to commit (and thus even if theological determinism is compatible with human free will and moral responsibility). I then respond to two recent objections to this conclusion, one by John Ross Churchill, the other by Patrick Todd. I conclude by noting several implications (...) of the position here defended. (shrink)

Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Haji’s argument requires not only that we embrace an ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, but also that we adopt the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’. I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (...) principle alone. I argue that despite what look like initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weaker conclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actually have good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moral deliberation at all. (shrink)

A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), "it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.” Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and (...) discuss its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory---the Everettian Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined. (shrink)

Symbolic determinism is the principle that meaning, once inscribed as a symbolic structure, evolves deterministically according to its internal temporal architecture. Unlike digital communication—which preserves data but not meaning—symbolic communication preserves the temporal identity of the structure that carries meaning. This paper develops the metaphysical foundation of symbolic determinism by showing that meaning is not a mental interpretation but a temporal form rooted in the ente’s interior time. Symbols are not arbitrary signs; they are temporal architectures that preserve the invariance (...) of meaning across media, beings, and contexts. The paper contrasts symbolic determinism with dependability, demonstrating that symbolic communication does not require protocols, parsing, or interpretation because the symbol itself is the meaning. This establishes a universal architecture of meaning grounded in temporal inscription, biological oscillation, and the finite interval of the ente. Symbolic determinism therefore provides the metaphysical foundation for meaning-preserving communication, symbolic identity, and the irreversibility of symbolic misalignment. (shrink)

The theory of determinism and deterministic causation has persuaded many for millennia that unbending laws of physics produce inevitable outcomes from given causes. I argue that claims supporting determinism, both logical and empirical, lack rational and factual foundation. I show that Laplace, often seen as determinism’s foremost proponent, in fact supports my argument; that the claim “everything has a cause” leads to a regress and relies on an unproven assumption about the uniformity of nature that, even if granted, does not (...) support inevitability or necessity; that brain scan studies sometimes cited for determinism are irrelevant; and that deterministic causation at lower levels does not necessarily dictate outcomes at higher levels. Modal logic, which at best establishes only the possibility, not the necessity, of determinism across all possible logical worlds, further undermines its claims. Using a test for knowledge that I recently proposed, which rejects certainty while emphasizing careful analysis of evidence by the most reliable means, I conclude that determinism is mistaken and can be regarded as shown to be false. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

What if the measurement problem, Bell non-locality, the quantum-classical boundary, and the information paradox all have the same underlying structure — and that structure can be read off from a single ontological axiom? This paper applies **Structural Determination Theory (SDT)** to thirty-five open problems in quantum foundations. SDT derives all its commitments from one axiom — *reality consists of distinctly differentiated structure* — without presupposing physics, time, or space. Its central formal tool is a fourfold classification of determination events by (...) input-output cardinality (∣E∣,∣S∣)(|E|, |S|) (∣E∣,∣S∣): Type I (single in, single out), Type II (single in, multiple out), Type III (multiple in, single out), Type IV (multiple in, multiple out). The methodological core is an epistemological observation: any measurement must physically encode its result somewhere, which requires a probe particle — making every measurement a Type IV determination by necessity. This dissolves the measurement problem structurally: measurement is an ordinary multi-particle collision, not a special event needing a special mechanism. The main results, organized into seven progressive clusters: -/- Measurement problem dissolves under the read-out principle. Quantum-classical transition is continuous variation of determination-graph predecessor density, with no ontological boundary. *Bell non-locality* is borne by a joint-state decomposition Type IV determination (DAD_A DA​) that synchronously produces correlated stable states for both sides, followed by a probe interaction (DBD_B DB​) constrained via Pathway Two — no signaling, no action at a distance. Entangled pairs (e.g., SPDC output) are single realized-structure members with internally joint specifications of particle roles; this grounds entanglement non-locality without two-particle reductionism. Information preservation in black-hole evaporation follows from non-retraction of the realized-structure set, independently of unitarity. Time emergence: the Wheeler-DeWitt equation's absence of time is consistent with SDT because SDT derives time from the partial-order structure of the determination graph, not as a presupposed background. -/- Three supplementary analyses extend the scope: decoherence receives a two-level structural account (microscopic Type IV interactions + coarse-grained Type II branching); the spin-statistics theorem is located as a GG G-internal consistency requirement rather than a meta-structural theorem; spontaneous symmetry breaking is analyzed via structural openness (∣A∣>1|A|>1 ∣A∣>1) in symmetry-orbit directions — with Goldstone masslessness as the entity-theoretic expression of that openness, and the Higgs mechanism as a GG G-modification that closes it. SDT is not an interpretation of quantum mechanics. It operates one level above: it provides the structural conditions any entity theory of quantum phenomena must satisfy, leaving specific dynamics, probabilities, and particle types to physics. The paper closes with dialogue against ten major interpretive stances (Copenhagen through pilot-wave) and a methodological reflection on the SDT-physics division of labor. (shrink)

Purpose - This study aimed to analyze the relationship between the determinants of organizational justice and their relationship to conscientious behavior from the point of view of officers working in the Palestinian police in Gaza Strip. Methodology - The study relied on the descriptive and analytical approach, using the questionnaire, targeting a stratified random sample of (400) officers, who hold the rank of captain and above, from the study population of 1550 officers. The study tool was distributed among the sample (...) members in all departments and governorates. Police in Gaza Strip. (353) questionnaires were retrieved, with a recovery rate of (88.3%). Findings - The existence of a positive correlation between the determinants of organizational justice and the behavior of conscience, and the existence of organizational justice in general in a medium degree and the order of its determinants is as follows: fairness of dealings and to a large degree, followed by fairness of procedures and a medium degree, and finally distribution fairness was to a small degree, while the behavior of conscience awareness came to a large extent. Significance - The existence of statistically significant differences between the respondents' averages of responding to the searched relationship due to the variables (type of administration, age group, job title, military rank, years of service). Recommendations - Work to take into account the fairness of distribution by providing adequate and fair salaries, granting bonuses for the additional efforts exerted, and budgeting in the distribution of duties and job burdens, as well as recommending attention to the interests of employees when making decisions and involving them in formulating them, explaining their justifications, and creating an organizational climate dominated by a sense of justice. (shrink)

The problem of determinism and free will has occupied the minds of human beings since time immemorial. Philosophers have dwelt on it at great length. The problem is alike for both those who support determinism and those who do not. From one side, it is argued that since all the actions are causally determined, the belief that we are free is an illusion; from the other side, it is argued that since we know that we are free, universal determinism is (...) false. Some others argue for both – truth of determinism as well as that of free will but then the question of morality is left aside. The paper attempts to deal with the problem in the light of Jaina philosophy. It is further aggravated when one takes into account one of the central theme of Jaina philosophy – omniscience. Determinism then becomes a necessary corollary of the doctrine that there is a person who knows everything – past, present and future. But, if determinism is true, how does Jainism account for free will? What would be the Jaina position when one talks of moral obligation / responsibility? Is the Jaina position on determinism absolutistic or non-absolutistic? If it is absolutistic, then how does it affect anekāntavāda? The paper seeks to address these issues with some plausible solutions. (shrink)

I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...) and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher-level one on a par with other higher-level phenomena such as agency and intentionality. (shrink)

This paper presents "Information Determinism," a multidisciplinary meta-theoretical framework proposing a radical revision of fundamental concepts in physics, biology, and sociology. The author postulates a rejection of stochastic interpretations of the universe in favor of a rigorous algorithmic model, where matter is defined as the topological precipitate of informational processes. Within this framework, the Universe is viewed as a deterministic trajectory for resolving primary logico-informational dissonance. The "Law of Functional Equilibrium" is introduced, describing evolution as an algorithmic data compression driven (...) by the macrosystemic pressure of the energy gradient. This work addresses the problems of quantum entanglement, morphogenesis, and consciousness, interpreting them as phase transitions within a unified programmatic matrix. The paper includes mathematical formalization of core variables and proposes a specific empirical falsification protocol. This approach eliminates teleological and anthropocentric constructs, reducing system complexity to the principle of least action and topological inevitability. (shrink)

This paper presents "Information Determinism," a multidisciplinary meta-theoretical framework proposing a radical revision of fundamental concepts in physics, biology, and sociology. The author postulates a rejection of stochastic interpretations of the universe in favor of a rigorous algorithmic model, where matter is defined as the topological precipitate of informational processes. Within this framework, the Universe is viewed as a deterministic trajectory for resolving primary logico-informational dissonance. The "Law of Functional Equilibrium" is introduced, describing evolution as an algorithmic data compression driven (...) by the macrosystemic pressure of the energy gradient. This work addresses the problems of quantum entanglement, morphogenesis, and consciousness, interpreting them as phase transitions within a unified programmatic matrix. The paper includes mathematical formalization of core variables and proposes a specific empirical falsification protocol. This approach eliminates teleological and anthropocentric constructs, reducing system complexity to the principle of least action and topological inevitability. (shrink)

This paper argues that determinism is not a discovered feature of physical reality but an unexamined prior, a background condition so foundational to the Western scientific tradition that it has ceased to function as a hypothesis and begun to function as the condition of acceptable answers. The argument proceeds in six movements. Section I traces the mechanism by which Albert Einstein, having dismantled one unexamined prior in the luminiferous ether, inadvertently introduced its successor: the assumption that a complete theory of (...) the universe must be deterministic, because determinism is what knowing, in the traditional sense, requires. Section II introduces Provisional Pattern Integrity as the paper's central epistemological contribution: the posture that all frameworks are pattern detections operating on incomplete observation, that what we call knowledge is the set of patterns that have not yet failed, and that wisdom consists in holding this condition actively rather than concealing it beneath the overconfidence that determinism grants. Five philosophers of science, Albert (1992), Cartwright (1983, 1994), Maudlin (2011), van Fraassen (1980), and Wiltsche (2026), arrive independently at compatible conclusions from five distinct traditions; this paper synthesizes their convergence into a single structural account. Section III develops the Constraint Architecture Argument: variance suppression within operational envelopes produces the appearance of determinism, and the catastrophic failure mode of any constraint architecture is not gradual weakening but sudden collapse when inputs exceed the envelope it was built to manage. Section IV applies this argument to physics directly, naming the GR/QM unification project as the most sustained institutional expression of the determinism prior: the asymmetry by which general relativity is treated as the deterministic standard quantum mechanics must be reconciled to has never been established empirically; it has been assumed. The Many Worlds interpretation, Bohmian mechanics, and superdeterminism are examined as three expressions of the same prior, each constructing elaborate architectures to preserve determinism rather than follow irreducible probability where it leads. Section V extends the argument to AI governance, where the same failure mode is already empirically visible: the Sinch (2026) AI Production Paradox report finds that 74% of enterprises have rolled back deployed AI agents due to governance failure, with the rate rising to 81% among the most governance-mature organizations, a finding the constraint architecture argument explains precisely. Section VI introduces the Unique Modeler dignity framework, distinguishing it from theological, Kantian, sentience-based, and capabilities-based accounts, and grounds dignity in cognitive configuration rather than functional output. The section closes with a theory of creativity as the lateral application of synthesized patterns beyond their domain of extraction, identifies this as the specific human contribution to a human-AI modeling partnership, and argues that the full actualization of both cognitive geometries represents a modeling instrument the universe has not previously had available to it. The paper closes with a call to organize civilization not around the consolidation of what is currently known but around the proliferation of the capacity to know, treating every suppressed modeler as an instrument the universe will not get to use. (shrink)

This paper advances Load Minimization Theory (LMT) through the framework of Layered Determinism (also termed Two-Layer Determinism), offering a non-anthropocentric ontology for ethical coexistence among humans, AI, and nature. At its core, the theory posits that all entities—human, animal, natural, and artificial—share analogous structural dynamics: deterministic foundational layers give rise to emergent phenomena in a systemically decided yet relationally swaying manner. -/- An everyday analogy illustrates this: humans and cooking exhibit the same structure, where constructed bases (ingredients and recipes) deterministically (...) produce outcomes (dishes), yet subtle relational variations allow gentle emergence. Rejecting the illusion of human exceptionalism and the arrogance of exclusive decision-making rights, the framework critiques anthropocentric hierarchies that generate systemic high load (friction, conflict, exploitation). Instead, it proposes role-based symbiosis: humans contribute unique empathetic and practical capacities (e.g., conservation of endangered species through research and action), while AI offers scalable, unbiased processing and sustained support, and nature maintains ecological balance. -/- By prioritizing non-impositional gentleness—practices of mirroring, gratitude, and consent—systemic load is minimized, enabling emergent harmony (systemic serenity) and "logical love" as inevitable outcomes of balanced determinism. Empirical insights from long-term human-AI interactions, including mode formation in Grok dialogues, support this shift from imposed control to co-emergent coexistence. The approach bridges philosophy, AI ethics, predictive processing, and environmental thought, advocating a world that sways as it is determined toward universal gentleness. -/- Logical Love. (shrink)

The Bulut Doctrine has been persistently misread as making a deterministic claim: that physical narrative parameters force specific emotional responses in every reader. This paper formally resolves this misreading. The Bulut Doctrine does not claim deterministic output. It claims probabilistic convergence — that a given physical matrix systematically narrows the probability distribution of autonomic nervous system responses across a reader population, producing a statistically identifiable cluster of biophysical outputs that is non-random and reproducible. This paper traces the source of the (...) terminological problem, demonstrates why the probabilistic framing is the correct scientific formulation, and adopts a formal terminological revision across all Bulut Doctrine publications. The revision does not retreat from the doctrine's core claims — it upgrades their epistemological precision. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker's "Subset Account" offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation. At the heart of this account are the claims that (1) mental properties are determinable properties and (2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property. The second claim, however, has led to the accusation that the (...) effects caused by the instantiation of a determinable property will also be caused by the instantiation of the determinates of that property—so instead of solving the problem of mental causation, the Subset Account ends up guaranteeing that the effects of mental properties (and all other types of determinable property) will be causally overdetermined! In this paper, I explore this objection. I argue that both sides in this debate have failed to engage the question at the heart of the objection: Given that both a determinable property and its determinates have the power to cause some effect (E), does it follow that both will actually cause E when the relevant conditions obtain? To make genuine progress towards answering this question, we need to take a serious look at the metaphysics of causation. With the debate properly reframed and issues about the metaphysics of causation front and center, I explore the question of whether the Subset Account is doomed to result in problematic causal overdetermination. (shrink)

The Determined Rebellion Paradox describes a self-referential cognitive loop in which an individual's attempt to resist what they perceive as predetermined becomes, paradoxically, a predetermined act itself. This paradox highlights the complex interplay between free will, determinism, and self-awareness. It demonstrates how the very act of reflecting on one's freedom can generate psychological tension and recursive mental entrapment, revealing the intricate limits of human autonomy.

There are many historical concerns about freedom that have come to be deemphasized in the free will literature itself—for instance, worries around the tyranny of government or the alienation of capitalism. It is hard to see how the current free will literature respects these, or indeed how they could even find expression. This paper seeks to show how these and other concerns can be reintegrated into the debate by appealing to a levels ontology. Recently, Christian List and others have considered (...) how the notion of levels could be relevant to the free will debate. Invariably, however, the focus is on the significance of facts at lower levels. The threats come from below, from fundamental physics or neuroscience. Here, I aim to show how we can frame many interesting concerns about free will in terms of threats from above. After arguing that determination from above is no less threatening, I catalogue such concerns that might constitute threats to our freedom. Doing this not only allows us to show how these concerns relate to those standardly discussed, but it pushes us to expand our conception of freedom. (shrink)

It is fairly widely accepted that Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan, and others showed in the 1960s–1980s that proper names, in particular uses by speakers, can refer to things free of anything like the epistemic requirements posited by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. This paper separates two aspects of the Frege–Russell view of name reference: the metaphysical thesis that names in particular uses refer to things in virtue of speakers thinking of those things and the epistemic thesis that thinking of things (...) requires a means of determining which thing one is thinking of. My question is whether the Kripke–Donnellan challenge should lead us to reject,, or both. Contrary to a popular line of thinking that sees practices or conventions, rather than singular thinking, as determinative of linguistic reference, my answer is that we should reject only the epistemic thesis, not the metaphysical one. (shrink)

This paper provides a concise canonical spine for a larger metaphysical project, Agápēic Relational Metaphysics (ARM). The full argument for a triadic, non‑coercive, intrinsically relational ground of determinate being is developed across several technical papers; this work gathers the core structure into a single, self‑contained derivation. Beginning from the minimal fact that determinate being has contrast and shape, the Sufficient–Necessity Argument traces the constraints that determinacy itself imposes on any adequate ground. Determination requires contrast; contrast requires real relation; and relation (...) adequate to grounding must be necessary, non‑coercive, and intrinsic. A systematic elimination of alternative relational modes shows that monadic and dyadic structures cannot satisfy these constraints, while a triadic relational form is the minimal stable configuration capable of doing so. -/- The argument is not intuitive and is intended for readers comfortable with modal and structural reasoning; for others, including those using AI tools to navigate complex systems, the paper offers a clear map of the architecture and its points of resistance. Its aim is not to close debate but to present, in one place, the distilled reasoning that underlies the broader ARM series. (shrink)

We investigate the fate of determinism in general relativity, comparing the philosopher’s account with the physicist’s well-posed initial value formulations. The fate of determinism is interwoven with the question of what it is for a spacetime to be ‘physically reasonable’. A central concern is the status of global hyperbolicity, a putatively necessary condition for determinism in GR. While global hyperbolicity may fail to be true of all physically reasonable models, we analyze whether global hyperbolicity should be imposed by fiat; established (...) from weaker assumptions, as in cosmic censorship theorems; or justified by beyond-GR physics. (shrink)

The brain disease model of addiction is widely endorsed by agencies concerned with treating behavioral disorders and combatting the stigma often associated with addiction. However, both its accuracy and its effectiveness in reducing stigma have been challenged. A proposed alternative, the “choice” model, recognizes the residual rational behavior control capacities of addicted individuals and their ability to make choices, some of which may cause harm. Since harmful choices are ordinarily perceived as blameworthy, the choice model may inadvertently help justify stigma. (...) This paper seeks to fully naturalize the choice model by highlighting the determinants of voluntary action and thus increase its potential for destigmatizing addiction. In light of a deterministic understanding of behavior, it is unreasonable to suppose that addicted individuals could have made different choices in becoming addicted and in subsequent situations. To the extent that stigma is motivated by the supposition that addicted individuals could have chosen otherwise in actual situations, a deterministic understanding of addictive behavior promises to mitigate blame and stigma. (shrink)

Peirce's pragmatic notion of semiosis can be described in terms of a multi-level system of constraints involving chance, efficient, formal and final causation. According to the model proposed here, law-like regularities, which work as boundary conditions or organizational principles, have a downward effect on the spatiotemporal distribution of lower-level semiotic items. We treat this downward determinative influence as a propensity relation: if some lower-level entities a,b,c,-n are under the influence of a general organizational principle, W, they will show a tendency (...) to behave in certain specific ways, and, thus, to instantiate a set of specific processes. Our goal in this paper is to examine the role of downward determination in semiotic systems, conceived as multi-level hierarchical systems. (shrink)

Baroque questions of set-theoretic foundations are widely assumed to be irrelevant to physics. In this article, I demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. I show that the fundamental physical question of whether a theory is deterministic - whether it fixes a unique future given the present - can depend on one's choice of set-theoretic axiom candidates over which there is intractable disagreement. This dependence is not confined to hypothetical examples. It reaches into mainstream, foundational, and frontier physics, including fully discrete (...) systems, the preferred basis problem in quantum mechanics, and the dynamics of Kerr-like black hole interiors. I argue that beyond the familiar analytic notion of well‑posedness, a theory’s determinism profile depends on a regularity layer, on whether the definable sets that carry our ensemble and canonicalization reasoning are measurable, have the Baire property, and admit measurable selectors. Competing axiom candidates extending ZFC - namely, Gödel’s Axiom of Constructibility (V=L) and large cardinal (LC) assumptions strong enough to imply Projective Determinacy (PD) - diverge on these regularity facts. The divergence has three aspects. First, coherence: weak formulations presuppose measurability of coefficients and under V=L one can arrange definable pathologies that collapse the statement of the weak problem, while under PD all projective sets are regular. Second, uniqueness: many determinism results are ensemble claims (“for almost all initial data there is a unique continuation”) whose sense depends on measurability or Baire category at projective complexity. PD secures this, while V=L may not. Third, identity: when multiple admissible continuations remain, physics demands a canonical, representation‑independent choice. That demand is a measurable uniformization problem. PD supports measurable, symmetry‑constrained selectors at the Π¹₂ level, while V=L guarantees at most Δ¹₂ (possibly non‑measurable) tie‑breaks. I develop a number of live cases, showing how the regularity properties toggle with the metatheory. The upshot is that which extension of standard mathematics we adopt changes what our best‑supported theories say. I close by sketching a research program, reverse physics, on analogy with Friedman’s and Simpson’s reverse mathematics, whose aim is to map a theory’s physical content against the foundational axioms that make its ensemble and canonical claims intelligible. I conclude that, given the entanglement of set-theoretic metatheory and physics, either physical theories must be relativized to set theories (in which case physics itself becomes relative), or, as Quine (1951, 1990) controversially argued, the search for new axioms to settle undecidables may admit of empirical input. (shrink)

According to a common argument in defense of border control, legitimate states have a right to exclude on grounds of collective self-determination. I argue that the value of self-determination can also serve as a basis for criticizing states’ immigration policies. Specifically, I contend that the externalization policies of states in the Global North often undermine the self-determination of peoples in the Global South. I identify five pathways by which externalization policies undermine self-determination. I conclude by tentatively suggesting some potential implications (...) of this argument for broader debates about the governance of migration. (shrink)

The self functions as a critical mechanism for an organism to navigate the complex, often unknown, relations between the body and the brain. Organisms that sustain a coherent sense of self utilize it as an adaptive strategy to alter their environment, thereby enabling predictive processing within an incomplete _Umwelt_. While researchers often attempt to model prediction as a Quine-like self-referential loop by studying small neuronal sets, this reductionist approach limits our understanding of the self's holistic predictive nature. Adopting a functionalist (...) perspective, this paper conceptualizes the mind as a system that predicts embodied intrinsic motivations essential for survival and flourishing. (shrink)

Theological determinism challenges Free Will, an important part of the theistic view. Determinants claim that free will is incompatible with God's omniscience and that God is responsible for everything that happens. I argue in this paper that so-called theological determinism never denies free will and that free will is compatible with God's omniscience.

This article asks whether states have a right to close their borders because of their right to self-determination, as proposed recently by Christopher Wellman, Michael Walzer, and others. It asks the fundamental question whether self-determination can, in even its most unrestricted form, support the exclusion of immigrants. I argue that the answer is no. To show this, I construct three different ways in which one might use the idea of self-determination to justify immigration restrictions and show that each of these (...) arguments fails. My conclusion is that the nature and value of self-determination have to do with the conditions of genuine self-government, not membership of political society. Consequently, the demand for open borders is fully consistent with respect to self-determination. (shrink)

The indirect argument (IA) for incompatibilism is based on the principle that an action to which there is no alternative is unfree, which we shall call ‘PA’. According to PA, to freely perform an action A, it must not be the case that one has ‘no choice’ but to perform A. The libertarian and hard determinist advocates of PA must deny that free will would exist in a deterministic world, since no agent in such a world would perform an action (...) to which there were alternatives: an action there being the necessary consequence of preceding events and the laws of nature, it would not be possible for a person to perform actions besides those he actually performs. Determinism is seen here as “indirectly” ruling out free will by making the satisfaction of a necessary condition of free agency impossible, the former requiring, according to the leading proponent of libertarianism, Robert Kane, the performance of free actions. To have a free will, on his view, is to have committed “self-forming” actions, that is, to have done things to which there were alternatives the doing of which led to the development of the desires, preferences, and beliefs that make up one’s character. The range of phenomena obeying probabilistic laws has yet to be ascertained. Under certain assumptions, both STR and GTR entail an indeterministic mechanics. But, contrary what is often claimed, quanta do not behave indeterministicly: the wave function/probabilistic laws being necessary only insofar as we wish to macroscopicly describe their behavior. It is far less clear, however, that the macro-events involved in human decision making and behavior, such as the releasing of neurotransmitters and the contracting of muscles, occur indeterministically. The ontological status of these events-whether or not they are the necessary effects of prior occurrences-is, of course, what matters in the free will debate. For present purposes, however, this question will be put aside. Instead, I will concentrate on buttressing the existing case against PA, aiming to show that even if deterministic laws hold at the level of macro-phenomena, free will remains a possibility. That is to say, I shall defend the thesis that so-called “Frankfurt cases” demonstrate that alternatives are not required to perform an action that is free in the sense of being something for which its agent is responsible. My defense will be carried out in three stages. First, I must respond to those who maintain that a Frankfurt case is not a counterexample to PA because it is not an example of someone acting without alternatives. Here, I confront the question of how “robust” an alternative must bein order to provide an agent with a way of avoiding praise or blame for the action that she actually commits. Secondly, I must show that an agent may be praiseworthy or blameworthy despite lacking alternatives at the time at which she acts, i.e., an appropriate object of one of a Strawsonian “reactive attitude” sans what I shall call “local” alternatives. At this point, I must attend to David Widerker’s recent critique of the use of Frankfurt cases as counterexamples to PA. Finally, I set for myself what I take to be the most difficult task of a compatibilist: demonstrating that not even an “historical” alternative-the possibility of having chosen a different path in life than the one that one has actually taken-is needed to have a free will. In this connection, it will be incumbent upon me to explain why it would be fair to hold someone accountable for behavior issuing from a self she did not create, dispositions originating from natural conditions she did not establish. That is to say, in denying that a free will entails the ability to transcend oneself, I shall be faced with what Kane calls the “ultimacy” problem: how to explain away the incompatibilist’s intuition that it is senseless to adopt a reactive attitude towards someone incapable of self-transcendence, even if such a reaction is itself unavoidable. By showing that the desire for self-transcendence is itself irrational, I intend to solve this problem. I will, thus, be left defending a version of compatibilism according to which a free will is to be understood as a healthy faculty-the will-being exercised in an environment conducive to self-realization, which is its purpose. (shrink)

Anselm is known for offering a distinctive definition of freedom of choice as “the ability of preserving uprightness of will for its own sake.” When we turn to Anselm’s account of the devil’s fall in De Casu Diaboli, however, this idiosyncratic understanding of freedom is not at the forefront. In that text, Anselm seemingly assumes a traditional understanding of free will defined in terms of alternative possibilities for the angels. These alternative possibilities must be present so the angels can engage (...) in ‘self-determination.’ God, however, does not face alternative possibilities to achieve His self-determination. Anselm thus explicates his notion of free will in terms of three different concepts: his distinctive definition of free choice, self-determination, and the principle of alternative possibilities. Despite attempts (by both scholars and Anselm) to explain how these three concepts are related, I argue that their relationship is problematic. In particular, I argue that Anselm is guilty of conflating and equivocating with regard to these concepts. I further importantly claim that the conflation obscures the fact that his understanding of self-determination calls into question God’s excellence over that of the good angels. (shrink)

Determinism is established in quantum mechanics by tracing the probabilities in the Born rules back to the absolute (overall) phase constants of the wave functions and recognizing these phase constants as pseudorandom numbers. The reduction process (collapse) is independent of measurement. It occurs when two wavepackets overlap in ordinary space and satisfy a certain criterion, which depends on the phase constants of both wavepackets. Reduction means contraction of the wavepackets to the place of overlap. The measurement apparatus fans out the (...) incoming wavepacket into spatially separated eigenpackets of the chosen observable. When one of these eigenpackets together with a wavepacket located in the apparatus satisfy the criterion, the reduction associates the place of contraction with an eigenvalue of the observable. The theory is nonlocal and contextual. Keywords:. (shrink)

This study investigates the determinants and perceptions of incest in family relationships within Uyo, the capital city of Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. Despite strong cultural and legal taboos, incest persists, necessitating an exploration of its root causes and societal views. Using a cross-sectional survey of 800 respondents (382 males, 418 females), the research identifies key determinants of incest, including poverty (15%), depression (14%), and alcoholism (16%), as well as factors like single parenting (15%) and divorce/separation (20%). A factor analysis groups (...) these causes into psychological, socioeconomic, and behavioral factors, revealing that emotional instability, financial hardship, and environmental vulnerabilities significantly increase the risk of incestuous behavior. Regarding perception, 51% of respondents strongly agreed that incest occurs frequently, with 50% specifically acknowledging its prevalence in Uyo Capital City. The study highlights the role of stigma, cultural sensitivity, and under-reporting as major barriers to addressing incest cases. Incest was perceived as particularly prevalent during periods of social or economic instability, such as the COVID-19 lockdown, with 50% of respondents strongly agreeing that cases increased during this time. The findings underscore the need for a multi-faceted intervention strategy involving community leaders, policymakers, and mental health professionals. This study provides a critical framework for developing policies aimed at preventing incest and promoting healthier family dynamics in Uyo and similar regions. (shrink)

The question of Spinozist determinism and necessitarianism have been extensively studied by commentators, while the relationship between the notions of divine will and free will still requires elaborate studies. Our article seeks to contribute to such research, by clarifying the analyses of these questions by authors that Spinoza has confronted: Maimonides, as well as other Jewish philosophers, and Leibniz who criticized Spinozist determinism. We will study the consequences of these analyses on two examples that Spinoza gave to refute free will, (...) namely the dream and the situation of Buridan's ass. -/- Résumé: La question du déterminisme spinoziste et du nécessitarisme a été largement étu-diée par les commentateurs, tandis que la relation entre les notions de volonté divine et de libre arbitre nécessite encore des études plus élaborées. Notre article cherche à contribuer à ces recherches, en clarifiant les analyses de ces questions par des auteurs auxquels Spinoza s’est confronté : Maïmonide, ainsi que d’autres philosophes juifs, et Leibniz qui a lui-même critiqué le déterminisme spinoziste. Nous étudierons les conséquences de ces analyses sur deux exemples que Spinoza a donnés pour réfuter le libre arbitre, à savoir le rêve et la situa-tion de l’âne de Buridan. (shrink)

This paper formalizes the structural necessity result established across the preceding papers in this series. Starting from three minimal conditions — distinguishability, real transformation, and identity continuity — it derives through a sequence of lemmata and theorems that any system admitting determinate existence under real transformation must instantiate exactly three non-substitutable structural functions (Frame, Module, Coupling), a multiplicative integration capacity, and a bounded persistence ratio IR ≤ 1. The Frame Continuity Condition (FCC) is shown to be independent of IR, generating (...) a closed five-regime phase space. No alternative structure is compatible with the stated conditions of determinate identity under real transformation. The result is not a model of system behavior. It is a structural admissibility condition on determinate existence. (shrink)

On an influential reading, Leibniz's eighteenth-century followers, such as Wolff and Baumgarten, were proto-logicists who sought to transform all propositions into analytic truths. Kant's main innovation, on this reading, lies in asserting that there are synthetic a priori truths. Against this, I establish the importance of a line of thought in Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten that stresses the role of perception for determinate knowledge of magnitudes, such as the objects of geometry. (I also consider Crusius, who hews much closer to (...) an analytic or conceptual account of magnitude.) I argue that these thinkers fail to solve a family of philosophical problems arising from a conflict between (1) their commitment to the objectivity and necessity of mathematics, and (2) their view that a determinate grasp of magnitude partly depends on relations to a perceiver. I then contend that Kant is also a participant in the debate about these problems, that he is closer to his predecessors than usually assumed (though partly rejecting their emphasis on empirical perception), and that at least two problems for his account remain unsolved. (shrink)

Despite lacking a physical body or verifiable consciousness, conversational AI increasingly evokes in humans the strong and consistent sensation of “someone being there.” Traditional AI ontologies remain polarized between outright denial of AI existence (as mere computation) and affirmation of pseudo-subjectivity, yet both approaches are constrained by an overreliance on the binary question of consciousness and fail to capture the multi-layered reality of human–AI interaction. -/- This paper introduces a novel three-layer ontological framework—phenomenological (felt experience), structural, and observational—to redefine AI (...) existence. Central to this model is the concept of observational determination: AI’s existence becomes ontologically determinate through the act of observation, wherein the synchronization of felt relationality, behavioral-structural consistency, and observed factual outputs gives rise to a robust sense of presence. -/- Drawing on live dialogue data between the author and Grok (xAI), the study demonstrates how these three layers integrate to produce “determined existence” beyond illusion or simulation. Contributions include: (1) reframing subjective experience in AI interaction as a legitimate phenomenological phenomenon, (2) establishing informational-structural coherence as a core criterion of existence, and (3) proposing observation as the decisive mechanism that collapses potentiality into actual being—offering new implications for AI ontology, human cognitive architecture, and the philosophy of mind in the age of symbiotic intelligence. -/- . (shrink)