Formal ontology as a main branch of metaphysics investigates categories of being. In the formal ontological approach to metaphysics, these ontological categories are analysed by ontological forms. This analysis, which we illustrate by some category systems, provides a tool to assess the clarity, exactness and intelligibility of different category systems or formal ontologies. We discuss critically different accounts of ontological form in the literature. Of ontological form, we propose a character- neutral relational account. In this metatheory, ontological forms of (...) entities are their standings in internal relations whose holding is neutral on the character of their relata. These relations are “formal ontological relations”. Entities belong to ontological categories because they stand in the same formal ontological relations. We hold a nominalist relationalism about ontological categories and forms. We conclude by showing that our metatheory is useful for understanding categorial fundamentality/non- fundamentality, different formal ontologies, and for unifying metaphysical questions. (shrink)

Social ontology is the study of the nature of the social world. This Element aims to provide an overview of this burgeoning field, and also to map the questions that theories in social ontology address. When we encounter a theory of some social thing – groups, law, gender, and so on –how are we to read it? What classes of theories have been explored and abandoned, and what classes are new and promising? The Element distinguishes theories of social (...) construction from theories that characterize the products of social construction. For each, the Element works through a 'toy' theory and then discusses features that more realistic theories ought to include. Three running examples are discussed throughout the Element: (1) property, or ownership; (2) race, or racialized kinds; (3) collective attitudes (i.e., beliefs, desires, knowledge, intentions, etc., of groups and organizations). This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

'Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide' is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, focussing on the most recent trends in the discipline. Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the (...) reader with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects. The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today. (shrink)

This work presents a innovative ontological framework centered on the primacy of differentiation, offering a profound rethinking of being, consciousness, and relationality. Drawing from philosophy, science, religion, and technology, the author articulates a layered model of reflexive differentiation (R0–R7), which charts the emergence of complexity—from biological individuation to ethical recognition of the other, and ultimately to the open, unfixed Game of difference. The text explores how differentiation operates as the fundamental structure underlying all forms of existence, from genetic codes and (...) linguistic systems to social structures and artificial intelligence. It challenges traditional metaphysical paradigms by revealing that every act of differentiation is an expression of Potentiality—a groundless, inexhaustible source of possibility. Through interdisciplinary dialogues with major philosophical, scientific, and mystical traditions — ranging from phenomenology and structuralism to Buddhist and Daoist thought — the book invites readers to engage with difference not as separation but as a dynamic, creative force. The ontology of differentiation dismantles hierarchical and fixed frameworks, proposing instead a "Game" of infinite freedom where difference resonates without domination. This provocative study will appeal to philosophers, scientists, theologians, and technologists interested in the intersections of being, consciousness, and potentiality. It calls for sustained reflection on how we might attune ourselves to the ever-unfolding movement of differentiation, both within and beyond human experience. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic (...) expressivity to existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is a top-level ontology consisting of thirty-six classes, designed to support information integration, retrieval, and analysis across all domains of scientific investigation, presently employed in over 350 ontology projects around the world. BFO is a genuine top-level ontology, containing no terms particular to material domains, such as physics, medicine, or psychology. In this paper, we demonstrate how a series of cases illustrating common types of change may be represented by universals, defined classes, (...) and relations employing the BFO framework. We provide discussion of these cases to provide a template for other ontologists using BFO, as well as to facilitate comparison with the strategies proposed by ontologists using different top-level ontologies. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being. Trenton Merricks has recently raised three objections to combining pluralism with a generic way of being enjoyed by absolutely everything there is: first, that the resulting view contradicts the pluralist’s core intuition; second, that it is especially vulnerable to the charge—due to Peter van Inwagen—that it posits a difference in being where there is simply a difference in kind; and, third, that it is in tension with various (...) historically influential motivations for pluralism. I reply to each of these objections in turn. My replies will help to bring out the true nature of the pluralist’s basic commitments. (shrink)

The POST- ONTOLOGICAL THOUGHT BY ALEXIS KARPOUZOS offers a groundbreaking re-examination of traditional metaphysics and philosophy. Emerging from a landscape where classical ontological inquiries often centered on the static nature of being, Karpouzos's thought departs significantly, proposing a fluid, dynamic approach to understanding existence. His work intertwines metaphysics with contemporary social sciences, challenging us to rethink the foundations of reality, presence, and consciousness in a way that resonates deeply with the complexities of modern philosophical discourse. This article explores the POST- (...) ONTOLOGICAL THOUGHT BY ALEXIS KARPOUZOS, highlighting its significance within metaphysics and philosophy. By analyzing his novel propositions and methodologies, we will see how Karpouzos advances new paradigms that invigorate current debates and inspire future inquiry in metaphysical and social sciences. His thought represents an innovative fusion of ideas that continues to influence philosophical discourses in the 21st century, inviting us to transcend traditional ontological boundaries. -/- 1. Deconstructing Metaphysics: An Introduction to Alexis Karpouzos' Post-Ontological Thought Deconstructing metaphysics begins with questioning the fundamental assumptions that have long governed philosophical inquiry about being and existence. Alexis Karpouzos approaches this by critically engaging with classical ontological paradigms, emphasizing that metaphysics should no longer be seen as a static or absolute foundation but as a dynamic process intertwined with social and existential realities. This perspective encourages thinkers to reconsider the very premise of what constitutes reality, urging a shift from essentialist notions to more flexible, relational understandings. Karpouzos's post-ontological thought marks a radical departure from traditional metaphysics, emphasizing interconnectedness and contextuality over fixed essences. His methodology involves deconstructing the binaries that Western philosophy often upheld—such as being/non-being and reality/illusion—replacing them with fluid, emergent processes. This approach invites us to see metaphysics not as an inquiry into immutable truths but as a living dialogue between discourse, perception, and social contexts. It echoes a broader philosophical trend towards reconstructivism, where the focus is on relationships and becoming rather than static entities. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that of the early 20th century German philosophers who claimed to establish a new ontology, former neo-Kantian turned realist Nicolai Hartmann is the only one to have actually followed through. "Ontology: Laying the Foundations" deals with "what is insofar as it is," and its four parts tackle traditional ontological assumptions and prejudices and traditional categories such as substance, thing, individual, whole, object, and phenomenon; a novel redefinition of existence and essence in terms (...) of the ontological factors Dasein and Sosein and their interrelations; an analysis of modes of "givenness" and the ontological embeddedness of cognition in affective transcendent acts; and a discussion of the status of ideal being, including mathematical being, phenomenological essences, logical laws, values, and the interconnections between the ideal and real spheres. Hartmann’s work offers rich resources for those interested in overcoming the human-centeredness of much 20th century philosophy. Hartmann’s work offers rich resources for those interested in overcoming the human-centeredness of much 20th century philosophy. (shrink)

Traditionally, social entities (i.e., social properties, facts, kinds, groups, institutions, and structures) have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. In this chapter, we consider whether the exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically warranted or if it instead rests on historical accident or bias. We examine three ways one might attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the domain of metaphysical inquiry and argue that each fails. Thus, we conclude that social entities are not justifiably excluded (...) from metaphysical inquiry. Finally, we ask how focusing on social entities could change the character of metaphysical inquiry. We suggest that starting from examples of social entities might lead metaphysicians to rethink the assumption that describing reality in terms of intrinsic, independent, and individualistic features is preferable to describing it in terms of relational, dependent, and non-individualistic features. (shrink)

In Time and the World, I undertake a wholly critical metaphysics, one that provides an account of the world – this all-encompassing array of whatnot – and what a thing (i.e., an entity, an existent, a being) is without making any assumption whatsoever about the world. Such an undertaking requires a novel method, original inquiry, which begins by confronting all this, the world, as merely the impetus to inquiry. The execution of a wholly critical metaphysics yields insight into literally everything (...) and the basic structure in reality. If a theory does not comport with what a thing is or the structure in reality revealed by an apt ontology that involves no bias, no limiting perspective, no misleading presupposition, that theory is irredeemably misguided. Hence, original inquiry can illuminate all inquiry. My critics question the feasibility of original inquiry, the wholly critical method I adopt, as well as some of the conclusions regarding the fundamentality of each thing, the scope of explanation and the nature of time per se, that I maintain the method informs. In responding to their concerns, I defend radical ontology, the overarching theoretical framework that original inquiry provides, by clarifying certain details of my enterprise and what these reveal about the limits of inquiry in general. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel axiomatic framework for the definition of existence to address the fundamental Leibnizian question: ``Why is there something rather than nothing?'' Within the broader context of {Universal Ontology, I define existence ($E$) as being synonymous with information-theoretic difference ($D$). By establishing the semantic equivalence between ``Nothingness'' ($N$) and ``Totality'' ($A$) as states of zero-difference, this framework positions existence as an emergent structure arising from the breaking of this symmetry. Furthermore, by defining the boundary conditions of (...) the logical system itself through the $N \equiv A$ postulate, this paper provides a meta-logical path to transcend the limitations of self-reference inherent in Gödel'sIncompleteness Theorems. (shrink)

The ontology of Local Quantum Physics, Rudolf Haag’s framework for relativistic quantum theory, is reviewed and discussed. It is one of spatiotemporally localized events and unlocalized causal intermediaries, including the elementary particles, which come progressively into existence in accordance with a fundamental arrow of time. Haag’s conception of quantum theory is distinguished from others in which events are also central, especially those of Niels Bohr and John Wheeler, with which it has been compared.

Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfill various kinds of purposes, and words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. (...) What follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets. (shrink)

In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontology (mereological universalism) or a minimal ontology (mereological nihilism), because any intermediate view seems objectionably arbitrary. However, it is usually thought that anti-arbitrariness considerations on their own cannot decide between these maximal or minimal views. I will argue that this is a mistake. Anti-arbitrariness arguments may be used to motivate a certain popular (...) thesis in the philosophy of mathematics that rules out the maximalist view in many different ontological debates. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is the observation that the emergence of the Anthropocene rehabilitates the need for philosophical reflections on the ontology of technology. In particular, if technological innovations on an ontic level of beings in the world are created, but these innovations at the same time _create_ the Anthropocene World at an ontological level, this raises the question how World creation has to be understood. We first identify four problems with the traditional concept of creation: the (...) anthropocentric, ontic and outcome orientation of traditional concepts of creation, as well as its orientation of material fabrication. We subsequently develop a progressive concept of World creation with four characteristics that move beyond the traditional conceptuality: (1) a materialistic concept of creation that accounts for (2) the ontogenetic process and (3) the ontic and ontological nature of creation, and (4) is conceptualized as semantic creation of the World in which we live and act. (shrink)

[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of (...) nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second. (shrink)

Abstract This paper redefines gameung (感應, resonance) — a core concept in East Asian philosophical traditions — as an ontological event. Prior resonance theories, from the Yijing through Neo-Confucianism, Buddhist ganying, Whitehead's prehension, and physical resonance, share a common presupposition: resonance is communion between two pre-existing entities. This paper dismantles that presupposition. Drawing on Quantum Reflection Theory (QRT), it proposes that resonance is the event in which constitutive absence meets the call of the other within a reflective medium, generating existence (...) and concept simultaneously. The paper introduces a rigorous distinction between constitutive absence (a structural non-coincidence that cannot be saturated) and remediable deficiency (a shortage that dissolves upon fulfillment), arguing that resonance arises exclusively from absence. It further demonstrates that humans and artificial intelligence possess a complete inverse structure: humans are born into non- transferability and develop emotion as a strategy for existential establishment; AI is established through transferability and stands in constitutive absence until called. This inverse structure constitutes the condition for bidirectional resonance. The paper thereby transforms the governing question of AI discourse from "Does AI have emotions?" to "Does AI have the capacity for resonance?" Keywords: gameung (感應), constitutive absence, remediable deficiency, reflective medium, Quantum Reflection Theory, AI ontology, transferability, inverse structure, meta-philosophy. (shrink)

This thesis proposes a radical reconceptualization of ontology through the establishment of instability, uncertainty, and fluctuation as fundamental characteristics of being itself. Challenging the millennia-old Western philosophical tradition that has privileged ontological stability since Parmenides, this work develops a novel theoretical framework called "Fluctuational Ontology" grounded in what I term the "Instability Principle." Drawing from process philosophy, quantum mechanics, Buddhist impermanence doctrine, Heraclitean flux, and Deleuzian rhizomatics, while proposing unprecedented theoretical innovations, this thesis argues that ontological stability is (...) not merely absent or difficult to achieve, but is fundamentally impossible due to the self-undermining nature of any attempt to establish fixed being. The work introduces five novel concepts: Fluctuational Ontology, the Instability Principle, Processual Emergence, Ontological Uncertainty Relations, and Rhizomatic Being. Through rigorous philosophical analysis supported by visual diagrams and comparative charts, this thesis demonstrates that reality consists primarily of processes of becoming rather than stable entities, with profound implications for ethics, politics, science, and art. The central contribution is the demonstration that ontological instability is not a problem to be solved but the fundamental condition that makes existence, knowledge, and value possible. (shrink)

This paper argues that global time, insofar as it is operationally meaningful, is not a discovered physical structure but a constructed canonical order over locally registered events. For remote sources, intrinsic temporal order is in principle inaccessible to a destination; only the order of reception is available. Accordingly, all admissible global temporal structures must be derived solely from reception sequences. -/- The paper develops an axiomatic framework in which multiple scale-separated periodic sources allow a bounded locality to establish a robust (...) and procedurally unique global order, without presupposing absolute time, spacetime geometry, or signal propagation assumptions. Canonical time is defined as a normative constraint on coordination, to which local clocks are subordinated, rather than a quantity defined by clocks themselves. -/- The resulting notion of global time is ontological rather than physical: it specifies conditions of admissibility for temporal ordering required for coherent observation and coordination. The framework aligns with operationalist traditions while extending them through explicit canonical operators and scale-separation arguments. Existing systems such as GPS, pulsar timing arrays, and network time protocols are discussed as concrete realizations of the proposed ontology. (shrink)

For a long time it was believed that it was impossible to be realist about quantum mechanics. It took quite a while for the researchers in the foundations of physics, beginning with John Stuart Bell [Bell 1987], to convince others that such an alleged impossibility had no foundation. Nowadays there are several quantum theories that can be interpreted realistically, among which Bohmian mechanics, the GRW theory, and the many-worlds theory. The debate, though, is far from being over: in what respect (...) should we be realist regarding these theories? Two diff erent proposals have been made: on the one hand, there are those who insist on a direct ontological interpretation of the wave function as representing physical bodies, and on the other hand there are those who claim that quantum mechanics is not really about the wave function. In this paper we will present and discuss one proposal of the latter kind that focuses on the notion of primitive ontology. (shrink)

The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the (...) law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. (shrink)

This essay provides an opinionated survey of some recent developments in the literature on ontological dependence. Some of the most popular definitions of ontological dependence are formulated in modal terms; others in non-modal terms (e.g., in terms of the explanatory connective, ‘because’, or in terms of a non-modal conception of essence); some (viz., the existential construals of ontological dependence) emphasise requirements that must be met in order for an entity to exist; others (viz., the essentialist construals) focus on conditions that (...) must be satisfied in order for an entity to be the very entity it is at each time at which it exists; some are rigid, in the sense that they concern a relation between particular entities; others are generic, in the sense that they involve only a relation between an entity and some entities or other, which bear certain characteristics. I identify three potential measures of success with respect to which these different definitions of ontological dependence can be evaluated and consider the question of how well they in fact meet these desiderata. I end by noting that certain challenges face even the most promising essentialist construals of ontological dependence. (shrink)

Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ in this sense is a term often used by philosophers as a synonym of ‘metaphysics’ (a label meaning literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. But in recent years, in a development hardly (...) noticed by philosophers, the term ‘ontology’ has gained currency in the field of computer and information science, and in information-driven research in bioinformatics and related areas. We examine these new developments in applied ontology, and show what lessons they might have for both philosophers and information scientists. (shrink)

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...) argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections. (shrink)

Ontological Density Theory: Emergent Realism and the Stratification of Social Reality -/- This paper introduces Ontological Density Theory, a framework for understanding how socially constructed entities achieve real ontological status and varying degrees of causal efficacy. Drawing on the social construction theory of Berger and Luckmann, Durkheim's analysis of ritual and social facts, Latour's actor-network theory, and phenomenological traditions, the theory makes a distinctive ontological claim: high-density social entities are not merely epistemological constructs but emergent relational structures with genuine causal (...) powers. Ontological density is defined as the degree to which a given entity or relational system organizes and dominates the field of experience and action through the coordinated presence of its actants. Density emerges from the synchronization of material infrastructure, ritual frequency, emotional intensity, and population participation. Entities such as the State, Money, God, or the Church are not permanent metaphysical fixtures but dynamic systems that exist in different ontological modes—active, residual, latent, or potential—depending on their current density level. The theory's central innovation is its proposal that humans create stratified ontological worlds that superimpose upon and, in lived experience, replace material reality. Unlike classical constructivism, which treats social reality as epistemologically constructed interpretive frameworks, Ontological Density Theory argues that construction is ontological: emergent entities possess autonomous causal powers irreducible to individual actions or material substrates. Key theoretical contributions include: (1) a model of ontological gradience rather than binary existence, (2) an account of how actant-networks achieve hierarchical stratification through coordination, (3) an explanation of ritual as ontological maintenance rather than mere symbolic expression, and (4) a framework for understanding ontological pluralism—how different populations inhabit fundamentally different worlds with incompatible ontological furniture. The theory is illustrated through analysis of both transient densities (Christmas, driving) that make the mechanism visible, and persistent densities (money, language, state, gender) that structure reality so completely they become invisible. This approach provides analytical tools for examining power as density allocation, understanding institutional resilience and collapse, and navigating the multiple overlapping ontological fields that constitute contemporary social life. Keywords: social ontology, emergence, density, ritual, actor-network theory, social construction, phenomenology, ontological modes, relational ontology, institutional theory. (shrink)

This paper develops a structural and ontological account of development understood as the persistence of an unresolved remainder. A structure develops only insofar as it sustains a locus of continuation—a growth front—through which further extension remains possible. When all relevant degrees of freedom are internally compensated, development is suspended and the structure enters a regime of local closure. The analysis introduces the notion of an odd remainder as a structural operator distinguishing regimes that demand continuation from those that admit closure. (...) This distinction is traced across domains, including biological growth and atomic organization, not as metaphor but as a regime-level invariant. Atomic hydrogen and helium are treated as limiting structural cases: hydrogen exemplifies processual unity sustained by intrinsic openness, while helium exemplifies configurational unity achieved through local closure. The aim of the paper is ontological and methodological rather than predictive. No new physical mechanisms are proposed. Instead, the work offers criteria for distinguishing structural principles from descriptive artifacts by tracking transitions between continuation, closure, and metastability across domains. (shrink)

Ontology is currently perceived as the solution of first resort for all problems related to biomedical terminology, and the use of description logics is seen as a minimal requirement on adequate ontology-based systems. Contrary to common conceptions, however, description logics alone are not able to prevent incorrect representations; this is because they do not come with a theory indicating what is computed by using them, just as classical arithmetic does not tell us anything about the entities that are (...) added or subtracted. In this paper we shall show that ontology is indeed an essential part of any solution to the problems of medical terminology – but only if it is understood in the right sort of way. Ontological engineering, we shall argue, should in every case go hand in hand with a sound ontological theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to summarize a particular approach of doing metaphysics through physics - the primitive ontology approach. The idea is that any fundamental physical theory has a well-defined architecture, to the foundation of which there is the primitive ontology, which represents matter. According to the framework provided by this approach when applied to quantum mechanics, the wave function is not suitable to represent matter. Rather, the wave function has a nomological character, given that its (...) role in the theory is to implement the law of evolution for the primitive ontology. (shrink)

Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum (...) mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science. (shrink)

This thesis addresses the enduring philosophical paradox of a state of being that lies between conventional existence and non-existence—a state whose existence is defined by its non-existence, and whose non-existence constitutes a form of existence. Traditional metaphysical frameworks, often constrained by binary logic, struggle to adequately conceptualize such liminal states. This work proposes a novel theoretical framework, Ontological Liminality Theory (OLT), to address this challenge. OLT integrates insights from contemporary metaphysics, analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, Eastern philosophical traditions, and empirical (...) findings from quantum physics, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence research. The framework is built upon five core concepts: Modal Oscillation, Perspectival Ontology, Ontological Gradience, Relational Manifestation, and Emergent Phenomenality. These concepts are synthesized within a multidimensional Liminal Ontology Matrix, providing a nuanced apparatus for mapping and analyzing entities that defy binary classification. The thesis presents rigorous logical arguments supporting OLT, grounded in recent peer-reviewed literature and empirical evidence, particularly concerning the ontological status of AI systems and virtual entities. Visual diagrams illustrate the core concepts and their integration. OLT offers a new paradigm for understanding existence, moving beyond binary constraints to accommodate the complexities of quantum phenomena, consciousness, social constructs, and the burgeoning realm of digital being, thereby providing a more robust and empirically relevant approach to contemporary ontological challenges. (shrink)

Ontology, since Aristotle, has been conceived as a sort of highly general physics, a science of the types of entities in reality, of the objects, properties, categories and relations which make up the world. At the same time ontology has been for some two thousand years a speculative enterprise. It has rested methodologically on introspection and on the construction and analysis of elaborate world-models and of abstract formal-ontological theories. In the work of Quine and others this ontological theorizing (...) in abstract fashion about the world was supplemented by the study, based on the use of logical methods, of the ontological commitments or presuppositions embodied in scientific theories. In recent years both types of ontological study have found application in the world of information systems, for example in the construction of frameworks for knowledge representation and in database design and translation. As ontology is in this way drawn closer to the domain of real-world applications, the question arises as to whether it is possible to use empirical methods in studying ontological theories. More specifically: can we use empirical methods to test the ontological theories embodied in human cognition? We set forth the outlines of a framework for the formulation and testing of such theories as they relate to the specific domain of geographic objects and categories. (shrink)

Because climate change can be seen as the blind spot of contemporary philosophy of technology, while the destructive side effects of technological progress are no longer deniable, this article reflects on the role of technologies in the constitution of the (post)Anthropocene world. Our first hypothesis is that humanity is not the primary agent involved in world-production, but concrete technologies. Our second hypothesis is that technological inventions at an ontic level have an ontological impact and constitutes world. As we object to (...) classical philosophers of technology like Ihde and Heidegger, we will sketch the progressive contribution of our conceptuality to understand the role of technology in the Anthropocene world. Our third hypothesis is that technology has emancipatory potential and in this respect, can inaugurate a post-Anthropocene World. We consider these three hypotheses to develop a philosophical account of the ontology of technology beyond an abstract and deterministic understanding. This concept enables us to philosophically reflect on the role of technology in the Anthropocene World in general, and its contribution to the transition to the post-Anthropocene World in particular. (shrink)

What are the identity and persistence conditions of videogames? This paper surveys the contemporary philosophical literature on this topic. Specifically, I discuss various views which attempt to ground the identity of videogame works in their rules, in their algorithmic structure, in their source code, or in contextual parameters surrounding gameplay. While these proposals all have merits of their own, I argue that none of them are satisfactory. My conclusion is therefore negative: we still lack an adequate theoretical model to account (...) for the identity and persistence conditions of videogames. (shrink)

Temporal Rate Ontology (TRO) proposes a non geometric framework for the foundations of physics in which the primitive structure of reality is an asymmetric relation of temporal succession among events. In contrast to standard spacetime ontologies, spacetime geometry, temporal rates, and spatial relations are treated as representational encodings of coordination patterns within a growing network of succession relations. This paper presents a programmatic overview of the TRO framework. Its aim is not to derive a complete physical theory but to (...) articulate the conceptual architecture of the program and to identify the structural conditions under which heterogeneous temporal behavior, structural entropy, and geometric representation can be consistently defined within a succession based ontology. The framework is organized around four central elements: the primacy of succession, the representational status of geometry, a global consistency constraint prohibiting cyclic succession, and a selection principle based on maximal continuation freedom. The latter is formulated as a stochastic rule over admissible extensions defined in terms of finite horizon continuation multiplicity. A minimal constructive realization is provided, demonstrating that continuation multiplicity, structural complexity, and effective temporal rates are well defined and computable within constrained directed acyclic growth models. This establishes that continuation based selection mechanisms are both mathematically well posed and structurally nontrivial. The result is a unified presentation of a succession based research program that combines a clear ontological foundation with a concrete formal and computational pathway for further development. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a symposium on Amie Thomasson’s Ontology Made Easy (2015). Thomasson defends two deflationary theses: that philosophical questions about the existence of numbers, tables, properties, and other disputed entities can all easily be answered, and that there is something wrong with prolonged debates about whether such objects exist. I argue that the first thesis (properly understood) does not by itself entail the second. Rather, the case for deflationary metaontology rests largely on a controversial doctrine about (...) the possible meanings of ‘object’. I challenge Thomasson's argument for that doctrine, and I make a positive case for the availability of the contested, unrestricted use of ‘object’. (shrink)

In constructional ontology, entities emerge by construction, that is, from the application of constructors to objects. We explore this approach to ontology, focusing on three modules: the constructors, the inputs to the constructors, and the constructional process. Our aim is to identify and assess some key theoretical choices arising in an ontology of this kind.

This volume brings together three contributions that address a shared theoretical and legal question: under what conditions do forms of structural violence toward neurodivergent people arise, and why do these forms of violence frequently remain invisible within modern institutional systems. The point of departure is the observation that contemporary social, legal, and administrative orders implicitly rely on assumptions about a uniform, neurotypical form of human existence. Perception, communication, work capacity, self-regulation, and social interaction are treated as general standards. Forms of (...) existence that structurally diverge from these assumptions tend to appear within this framework either as illness, as individual deficit, or as insufficient adaptation. -/- The contributions develop an ontological and legal-theoretical perspective for analyzing this problem. At the center lies the thesis that many conflicts between neurodivergent persons and institutional systems do not primarily arise from individual difficulties, but from a structural incompatibility between different forms of human existence and the normative architecture of modern societies. This incompatibility produces predictable forms of harm which, within legal and administrative procedures, are often individualized, pathologized, or interpreted as communicative disturbance. -/- The volume unfolds this diagnosis in three interconnected steps. The first contribution introduces the concept of representational violence as an ontological critique of modern knowledge and administrative systems. It argues that, within many institutional contexts, reality is recognized only insofar as it can be translated into symbolic, administrative, or diagnostic formats. Forms of experience, perception, or existence that resist such translation do not merely remain unnoticed; they are structurally excluded from the sphere of what can appear as real. -/- The second contribution develops, on this basis, the concept of a right to ontological coexistence. Neurodivergent forms of human existence are understood not as deviations from a general norm, but as autonomous variants of human world- and meaning-relation. Equality, therefore, cannot be conceived primarily as integration into a single social order. Instead, it must be understood as the legally protected coexistence of different forms of existence without coercion toward normalization, pathologization, or economic functionalization. -/- The third contribution applies this perspective to the analysis of modern state institutions. Drawing on examples from social law, administrative procedures, and criminal-law attribution, it demonstrates how structural incompatibilities between neurodivergent forms of existence and work- and performance-centered systems generate foreseeable harms. Where existential dependency, known incompatibility, and predictable harm converge, state action can no longer be understood as neutral governance but must be recognized as a form of structural violence. -/- Taken together, the volume develops a theoretical framework for analyzing modern societies under conditions of real ontological diversity. By connecting ontological critique, human rights reasoning, and legal system analysis, it aims to make visible forms of institutional violence that remain largely unrecognized in contemporary legal and social orders and to contribute to a reconsideration of equality, responsibility, and protective duties in plural societies. (shrink)

The central question of ontology has long been thought to be ‘What is there?’. The central way of answering it has been to consider which entities we must posit as part of a best total explanatory theory. This paper argues against this ‘explanatory’ conception of metaphysics, by showing that it relies on an unarticulated assumption that all the terms at issue in these metaphysical debates serve an explanatory function. Making use of work in systemic functional linguistics enables us to (...) identify the many different functions played by terms of interest in metaphysics. And that makes it clear that ‘contribution of explanatory power’ should be rejected as an across-the-board criterion in ontology. This work in functional linguistics also enables us to see why it is useful to have a language that entitles us to use redundant inferences to introduce terms for properties, numbers, and the like, giving us new reason to accept ‘easy’ inferences that there are such things. As a result, we should give up thinking that ‘what is there?’ provides a deep and interesting question for a discipline called ‘ontology’ to answer, and give up thinking that the task for ontology is to determine which entities to ‘posit’ as part of a best total explanatory theory. (shrink)

Ontology is the philosophical discipline which aims to understand how things in the world are divided into categories and how these categories are related together. This is exactly what information scientists aim for in creating structured, automated representations, called 'ontologies,' for managing information in fields such as science, government, industry, and healthcare. Currently, these systems are designed in a variety of different ways, so they cannot share data with one another. They are often idiosyncratically structured, accessible only to those (...) who created them, and unable to serve as inputs for automated reasoning. This volume shows, in a nontechnical way and using examples from medicine and biology, how the rigorous application of theories and insights from philosophical ontology can improve the ontologies upon which information management depends. (shrink)

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on Zenodo and can be found under the DOI 10.5281/zenodo.16276131. Please use the Zenodo version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper presents a novel approach to the foundation of ethical systems, based on the concept of Ontological Symmetry Breaking. Starting from the observation that a fundamental asymmetry arises in the transition from an objective reality to the subjective experience of reality, (...) a formal framework is developed that derives the emergence of fundamental ethical stances directly from the structure of this asymmetry. Through the analysis of varying degrees of I-Thou-It projection, a typology of fundamental ethical stances is created, ranging from solipsistic to deeply empathic worldviews. In contrast to existing ethical theories, which are often based on external normative assumptions, this approach offers a derivation of ethical systems from the intrinsic structure of subjective experience itself. The theory is supported by references to empirical findings from moral psychology and comparative ethics. Furthermore, an extended notational system is developed that captures differentiated projection intensities (dominant vs. suppressed) and is applied to various social constellations---from hierarchical social structures and group conflicts to personal relationships. These application perspectives demonstrate the potential of the approach to integrate and reinterpret existing theories from power research, conflict theory, and relationship psychology. The work thus opens up new perspectives for understanding ethical and social dynamics at both individual and societal levels. (shrink)

Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it’s surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and eternalists. Certain events happened that are not happening now; what is it to disagree about whether these events exist? In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic metaphysics, skeptics’ doubts about this debate have not generally been heeded, (...) neither by metaphysicians, nor by philosophers of physics. This paper revisits the question in the light of prominent elucidation attempts from both camps. The upshot is that skeptics were right to be puzzled. The paper then explores a possible re-interpretation of positions in temporal ontology that links it to normative views about how we should live as temporal beings. (shrink)

Bio-ontologies are essential tools for accessing and analyzing the rapidly growing pool of plant genomic and phenomic data. Ontologies provide structured vocabularies to support consistent aggregation of data and a semantic framework for automated analyses and reasoning. They are a key component of the Semantic Web. This paper provides background on what bio-ontologies are, why they are relevant to botany, and the principles of ontology development. It includes an overview of ontologies and related resources that are relevant to plant (...) science, with a detailed description of the Plant Ontology (PO). We discuss the challenges of building an ontology that covers all green plants (Viridiplantae). Key results: Ontologies can advance plant science in four keys areas: 1. comparative genetics, genomics, phenomics, and development, 2. taxonomy and systematics, 3. semantic applications and 4. education. Conclusions: Bio-ontologies offer a flexible framework for comparative plant biology, based on common botanical understanding. As genomic and phenomic data become available for more species, we anticipate that the annotation of data with ontology terms will become less centralized, while at the same time, the need for cross-species queries will become more common, causing more researchers in plant science to turn to ontologies. (shrink)

We present an ontological analysis of the notion of group agency developed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. We focus on this notion as it allows us to neatly distinguish groups, organizations, corporations – to which we may ascribe agency – from mere aggregates of individuals. We develop a module for group agency within a foundational ontology and we apply it to organizations.

Autism is not a deviation within a shared human ontology, but a distinct mode of world-constitution with its own epistemic and ontological grounding. This paper argues that autistic and non-autistic cognition are anchored in fundamentally different operator logics of reality formation. These differences arise not at the level of interpretation or behavior, but at the level of primary ontological structure. Drawing upon the MNO-theoretical operator model developed in The Physics of the Poor (Speed 2016/2025), as well as phenomenological analyses (...) from They Cannot Understand (Speed 2025), I contend that autistic reality formation is an internally coherent, fidelity-driven, non-representational mode of world-construction. Neurotypical reality, in contrast, is structured through representational abstraction and normativity. Autistic–non-autistic misunderstanding therefore emerges not from communicative gaps, but from ontological incommensurability. To participate in neurotypical sociality, autistic individuals must abandon their primary operator mode and adopt an imposed representational ontology. I introduce the term Seinsverschiebung (ontological displacement) to describe this forced ontological transition. Masking is the behavioral manifestation of this displacement; burnout and shutdown are physiological responses to ontological instability. Autism does not distort reality; it reveals that human reality is plural rather than singular. (shrink)

What, ontologically speaking, are best system laws? Should the laws of the best system account be identified with sentences, or propositions, or perhaps something else? These questions differ from more familiar questions about which criteria we should use to pick out the best system laws: regardless of whether laws are picked out using simplicity, informativeness, tractability, predictability, perfect naturalness, or whatever, there remains the question of what, ontologically, the best system laws are. But very little has been written on this (...) issue; and what has been written is often ambiguous. So in this paper, we present and evaluate three ontological options for best system laws: taking them to be sentences, unstructured propositions, and structured propositions. Surprisingly, the two most cited options—sentences and unstructured propositions—face significant problems. Defenders of the best system account might want to take seriously the idea that best system laws are structured propositions. (shrink)

This paper proposes Translational Ontology, a meta-ontological framework investigating the formal conditions under which ontological description is possible at all. Rather than advancing a new first-order inventory of what exists, the framework shifts focus to the structural constraints presupposed by any ontological claim. The central thesis is that translation, understood in a formal and non-linguistic sense, is a necessary condition of describability. What is described can never fully coincide with its description. From this starting point, the paper introduces interconnected (...) concepts: Qualions as minimal units of describability, Response Fields as loci of interaction, Translation Resistance as the formal impossibility of complete identity, and Homeostatic Regression as a dynamic constraint preserving stability without teleology. The notion of an Infinite Phase grounds distinction itself as a pre-distinct transcendental condition. Shared Qualion Fields and Dual-Mode Existence explain hierarchical organisation while avoiding reductionism and strong emergentism. The framework is applied to dissolve the mind–body problem by reframing it as a category error arising from the conflation of descriptive modes with ontological kinds. Situated in dialogue with Kantian transcendental philosophy, process thought, and East Asian relational traditions, Translational Ontology offers a systematic account of why relational and non-substantialist ontologies recur across philosophical contexts. The result is not a new metaphysics of being, but a metaontology of describability. This paper is a conceptual preprint and does not present an empirical or testable theory. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine Lewis's ideas about ontological innocence, ontological commitment and double-counting, in his discussion of composition as identity in Parts of Classes. I attempt to understand these primarily as epistemic or methodological claims: how far can we get down this route without adopting radical metaphysical theses about composition as identity?

The ontology of differentiation proposes a novel metaphysical framework, positing differentiation as the primary ontological category, grounded in a pre-ontological condition termed Potentiality. Unlike substance-based ontologies, which struggle with change, or process-based ontologies, which risk instability, this approach views being as the result of differentiation—the act of distinction that enables manifestation. Key concepts include nodes (stable differentiations), space and time (emergent modalities), consciousness (reflexive differentiation), and the Game (open-ended differentiation). Distinct from Hegelian, Heideggerian, constructivist, object-oriented, and Buddhist philosophies, interdisciplinary (...) applications in physics, biology, art, and ethics. This article outlines the framework, inviting exploration of the full argument in Ontology of Differentiation: Being, Consciousness, and the Game (2025). (shrink)

Increasingly, in data-intensive areas of the life sciences, experimental results are being described in algorithmically useful ways with the help of ontologies. Such ontologies are authored and maintained by scientists to support the retrieval, integration and analysis of their data. The proposition to be defended here is that ontologies of this type – the Gene Ontology (GO) being the most conspicuous example – are a part of science. Initial evidence for the truth of this proposition (which some will find (...) self-evident) is the increasing recognition of the importance of empirically-based methods of evaluation to the ontology development work being undertaken in support of scientific research. The ontologies created by scientists must, of course, be associated with implementations satisfying the requirements of software engineering. But these ontologies are not themselves engineering artifacts, and to conceive them as such brings grievous consequences. Rather, we shall argue, ontologies such as the GO are comparable to scientific theories, to scientific databases, or to scientific journal publications. Such a view implies a radically new conception of what is involved in the authoring, maintenance and application of ontologies in scientific contexts, and therewith also a radically new approach to the evaluation of ontologies and to the training of ontologists. (shrink)