Self-Identity and the Origins of Equality: A Non-Platonic Conception

Abstract

Plato argues in the Phaedo that we never observe perfect equality in the sensible world, only approximations, and uses this to establish the necessity of transcendent Forms. I argue against this position by demonstrating that perfect equality is directly observable in external reality through self-identity. Any object A at time T is perfectly equal to itself (A=A), providing immediate access to perfect equality without requiring transcendent Forms. I show that the concept of equality is parasitic on self-identity: we observe self-identity first, then project it onto relations between distinct objects. What appears to be equality between distinct things (A=B) is either a cognitive error caused by perceptual limitations or the re-identification of the same object across contexts. I defend this view against several objections: that measurement is more primitive than self-identity, that pattern recognition precedes categorization, and that cognitive mediation prevents direct observation of self-identity. The result is an immanent account of equality that eliminates the explanatory role of Platonic Forms.

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