Nepal at the crossroads: Gen Z uprising and political change after Oli

Nirupama: Akhilesh, what’s the situation today after the army took charge?

Akhilesh Upadhyay: The situation is much calmer. Nepal’s history of army intervention is different from Pakistan or Bangladesh—there’s no history of army chiefs being adventurous at the cost of civilian government. The army was reluctant to emerge and had to be persuaded because there was no party in government per se to mobilise.

I found this morning that there was an extensive conversation between army leadership and Gen Z activists—many are women who participated in talks last night. The Kathmandu streets are calmer than last night. There’s a big mall next to me, which was partly set on fire—it’s calmed down. Gen Z activists are on the ground, cleaning up streets and showing hope and determination. Tuesday morning was extremely volatile, including near the CPN (UML) [Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist)] headquarters where I live—KP Oli’s party office. His whereabouts remain unknown—some say Dubai, some say hiding, some say he fled through the open border to India.

Nirupama: There’s now a vacuum. Mayor Balendra Shah of Kathmandu positioned himself early with a Facebook post appealing for calm, saying the PM has resigned and asking for dialogue. Tell us about this former rapper turned mayor.

Akhilesh: Three years ago, during local elections, the traditional power centres—Nepali Congress (centrist) and CPN (UML) (Communist Party)—have been taking turns since 1990. The Maoist Party, led by Prachanda, joined after 2006. But conventional wisdom said one of two candidates would prevail: a former UML mayor or a Nepali Congress legacy family woman.

I talked to young people randomly—I was out of Kathmandu Post then, free to roam without the baggage of being the editor in chief of a newspaper.. In conversations, youth said they’d rather vote for Balen. He was unknown—the most generous prediction from a senior editor was 12,000 votes, more as a spoiler than a winner. But he won by a landslide.

He’s young, doesn’t speak “party language” as I call it—the language parties use that young people don’t buy anymore. But I’m wary of deifying a single person in a movement. While Balen represents Gen Z to some extent, I hope more elements come forward—maybe the fourth largest party, the Rastriya Swatantra Party, faces from civil society, ethnic groups, and academics. The army itself cannot carry political momentum long-term.

R.K. Radhakrishnan: There are similarities with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The defining moment here was a hit-and-run case—a car belonging to the Koshi province Finance Minister hit an 11-year-old girl. Oli called it a “minor incident,” said compensation would be paid, and the driver was out in 24 hours. This mirrors the impunity we saw with the Awami League in Bangladesh and the Rajapaksa clan in Sri Lanka.

The institutions of governance—courts, parliament, executive, media—have all fused. We saw the Kantipur media office burned to the ground. This phenomenon appears across the world where institutions become compliant. My contacts in Nepal aren’t worried about provisions or electricity cuts—they’re looking forward to a better tomorrow. Violence has died down, and they have a list of potential leaders.

What kind of interim administration do you envision? Reports suggest Rastriya Swatantra Party leader Rabi Lamichhane has been released, and Sumana Shrestha has emerged as a favourite.

Akhilesh: The interim phase problem is that elections are said to be around the corner but the corner keeps moving—when will elections happen? When a groundswell occurs, there’s acceptance of emerging people, but groundswells don’t last, and public opinion can be fickle. Kathmandu’s mood yesterday versus now is 100 per cent different.

This isn’t one government handing to another after election results—it’s a regime change. The graph won’t drop steadily in temperature but will fluctuate. Civilian faces acceptable to broader society—the broader the better, but not so broad that they fight each other. I was happy that conversations between the army leadership and Gen Z representatives included women. This makes it more broad-based rather than centralising dialogue to a single person like Balen.

What changes will this interim administration prepare for? Will it follow the present constitution or be a completely different transition?

Akhilesh: The best approach for non-violent transition is constitutionalism—a backbone process. Our constitution was drawn through the 2006 movement and the elected constituent assembly twice. It was time-consuming but acceptable to broad constituencies.

However, this constitution doesn’t allow what’s currently happening—the groundswell. In democracies, groundswell takes precedence over constitutionalism for that small window when people demand change. One non-messy way is a constitutional amendment, as we did in 1990 with amendments endorsed by the president and public acceptance .Gen Z’s position, not stated but public, is that they don’t like the current constitution. There could be a quickly drawn interim constitution, as in 1990.

What’s their problem with the current constitution?

Akhilesh: One issue raised is whether we need provincial assemblies for a country not necessarily large, though very diverse. There’s been debate about provinces’ financial viability, tax raising, and constituency size. As a federalist myself, this opens different challenges.

If the objection is anti-federal, that opens more cans of worms, and suggests a very different country.

Akhilesh: Different constitutionalism, not country. Some provinces, especially mother provinces, have strong federalism constituencies. These are challenges the transitional leadership must address. This tests whether Balen can rise to the challenge—running a mayoral government successfully is different from governing a constituency as diverse as Nepal, with 100 dialects and many ethnic groups.

R.K. Radhakrishnan: People have no sympathy even for the finance minister beaten up and pushed into the river, or for the former prime minister’s wife’s killing. The anger is immense. Youth must be part of any setup. The Rastriya Swatantra Party seems acceptable—formed in 2022, it was in government but parted ways in 2024.

Will someone like Rabi [Lamichhane] be acceptable? He was the head of Galaxy 4K television, not extremely clean, but for want of someone better, he’s there alongside Balen. Sumana Shrestha, a former Education Minister, around 40, represents a different generation. Harka Sampang, a mayor with a British Army background, has traction. Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki also emerges. These personalities are aware of pressures from various intelligence agencies. From 2008 onwards, they’ve seen 13-14 governments, and many politicians think India has a hand in government changes.

Is Gen Z positioned to understand that change takes time, unlike the demand for immediate constitutional reform in Bangladesh?

Akhilesh: Crisis throws up new parties and leaders—that’s world history. The country needs leaders who are broadly compromising, not dogmatic. This is Balen’s biggest test—governing diverse Nepal is different from running Kathmandu city.

If he brings in other acceptable faces people want to see, the party has solid technocrats like Dr. Swarnim Wagle, an economist, and Harka Sampang, who speaks a global leader’s language as fluently as Nepali to crowds. He understands economics better than most MPs, given his institutional background.

But let’s not discard the Nepali Congress and the UML into history’s dustbin suddenly. Yes, Oli fled and was vilified, but there are solid faces in the Nepali Congress with constituency trust, tested multiple times in elections. They’ll reinvent and find leaders acceptable to new generations.

We’re at beautiful uncertainty. The transition government needs non-party faces. Some friends were frightened this morning about how far Gen Z could go. You can’t suddenly say only 20-somethings will rule Nepal. People are more accepting of the army than the police for now, but that will change.

We need an inclusive transition. Nepal’s geography spans from the Himalayas to the tropics in a tiny space, with Kathmandu the largest. Eastern Nepal touches Sikkim, north is Tibet, south borders UP and Bihar, western mountains next to Uttarakhand. It’s extremely diverse.

Thanks to the Gen Z movement, they’ve successfully coalesced various coalitions, giving everyone hope. They wanted to define their own history, not draw parallels to Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Nepal’s 1990 and 2006 movements. Credit to them, but let’s not get carried away that only Gen Z leaders will carry Nepal forward.

You mentioned friends shocked at how far Gen Z could go—was this about the violence, arson, targeting politicians? Did anyone foresee the transformation from peaceful September 8th protests to murderous mob violence?

 I’d be first to admit I didn’t foresee Nepal changing upside down in 24 hours. Any analyst claiming they foresaw this would be delusional. I live by the Prime Minister’s party headquarters—it was business as usual. Some parts were vandalised, not burned down. Television footage can be exaggerating—when you see burning footage, you think all Kathmandu burned down. Friends worldwide message asking if I’m okay, but it’s not so bad.

What happened Monday? Serious clampdown on peaceful protesters—young kids in uniforms. That’s not done in democracy. The next 24 hours, this footage was widely shared. Nepal’s population is well-plugged globally—huge diaspora in US, Australia. One percent of Australia’s population is Nepali. Hobart has close to 20 per cent Nepali population.

These young kids share aspirations and deep frustrations with a dnon-performing political class who don’t speak their language. They’re aspirational, have seen the world, are tech-savvy with well-developed worldviews. There’s this idea by old generational thinkers—you can be young but old in mind—to dismiss young people’s aspirations: “They don’t get it, they’re not Nepali enough, not political enough.”

This will change in the next year or two. Elections hopefully after six months to a year when the situation normalises. Voter rolls will expand—many young people not on lists who didn’t care to vote will want to vote now because they believe in personal agency. There’ll be massive turnout. The biggest manifestation of political awakening would be enfranchisement of Nepali diaspora. Close to 5 million live abroad or work as remittance workers in Malaysia, the Gulf. We must find political expression for these people.

These diaspora are the economic backbone, earning and remitting money. Unemployment is huge—1 in 5 in the working force unemployed. Economic recovery will take time.

Akhilesh: Yes and no. Growth has been steady—four-point-something isn’t bad. Compared to China and India’s steady growth for decades, we pale but haven’t done too badly. I agree we’re in a remittance trap—Nepal has among the world’s highest reliance on remittance earnings as GDP share, alongside tiny Caribbean and Pacific countries.

Because we’re not 1.4 billion like India, we just need steady growth for five years for economic stabilisation. New leadership needs solid imagination of political transformation. We’ve talked enough about 1990 movement politics, 2006 movement, ideological politics, inclusion—that’s fine. But we need demographic dividends of young people working in our country rather than toiling and dying in the Gulf.

Earlier this year, in March 2025, we saw protests demanding the monarchy return, also rooted in economic discontent and unemployment. Any link to current protests?

Akhilesh: In protests as diverse as yesterday’s across Nepal, there are diverse forces—everyone discontent with government and the post-2006 regime parties dominating politics.

But that was only a political movement wanting the King back. There’s more appetite for the kind of cultural revival sweeping the East—China calls it “rejuvenation.” With economic prosperity in China and India, there’s a deep revivalism sense. Nepal wants has appetite to have its history written by Nepalese, celebrating our past across communities but diversely rather than the unified history monarchy propagated for 30 years with themselves central to everything Nepali. There are die-hard royalists, but do they represent broad Nepali mass? I have a question mark. As an analyst, I remain open to listen to ideas otherwise.

R.K. Radhakrishnan: The royalty issue from 2015 has Indian connections. There’s a view in the  Indian establishment that monarchy would be better to reclaim Hindu kingdom status in Nepal. On September 3, lawmakers questioned the PM about China’s Global Security Initiative—Nepal Foreign Ministry said we’re on board with China.

Can India be blamed for this protest? Is there anti-India sentiment at work, and does the common man accuse India of fostering these problems?

Akhilesh: I’m glad you’re asking because many shows suggest anti-China movement with Chinese involvement, or American Deep State involvement because TikTok was open but Facebook wasn’t. There’s also the view that because KP wasn’t popular with Delhi government, there were machinations to topple Oli. As someone believing in evidence-based analysis, I have no evidence supporting any of these conspiracy theories. This beautiful valley Kathmandu just circulates conspiracy theories because every second person claims something new.

About religion and Nepali voters, the largest pro-royalist party, RPP, is the fifth largest. Religion has never been a trump card in Nepal’s politics yet. In recent by-elections, RPP candidates were dropped. But given our state of flux, who knows if bigger parties may embrace Sanatan Dharma language rather than declared secularism.

There’s serious following across political parties for Hinduism as culture. When Modi visits Muktinath at high altitude, Lumbini (Buddha’s birthplace), and Janakpur Dham speaking in Maithili, he connects culturally. We see him as cultural ambassador rather than political ambassador of Hinduism or Sanatan Dharma. In Nepal, Hindu elements haven’t manifested in voting yet.

R.K. Radhakrishnan: The Indian angle is problematic—for anything in Nepal, there’s always Indian, Chinese, or US angles. From 2015 blockade, bad blood continues regardless of government transitions. Every government cannot ignore anti-India sentiment and cannot easily engage with Delhi as before.

Akhilesh: Because of open borders and deep cultural links between Indian and Nepali populations—forget states, forget governments—our rivers flow to India. Rivers are holy on both sides. Ganga to Koshi are holy sites flowing across borders. I’m from the border town of Bhadrapur, where the Mechi River flows. During Chhath, devotees take holy dips. Other side is Galgalia station in Bihar, this side is my birthtown, next to Siliguri in West Bengal.

Because India-Nepal ties are so intimate, there’ll always be problems. Indian state in Delhi is prone to huge mistakes. The 2015 blockade when they didn’t like our constitution was a solid recent manifestation. Only months after Nepal’s largest earthquake in modern history, Indian help was most generous and first—Maitri is perhaps the biggest rehab project India conducted outside its territory. But they spoiled it quickly with the  2015 blockade. Then Indians said Nepalese are playing China card. Which card do we play? When border is locked this side, we must find transit for export and trade from northern side, which is extremely difficult but China is also big power and ready. These are cliches—”Nepal playing China card again.” What card is Nepal going to play, for heaven’s sake?

Speaking of China, I haven’t seen reaction from China yet, though Oli was there for SCO summit 10 days ago. India responded with concern about violence. Has China said anything?

Akhilesh: I haven’t seen it, but China is that kind of power anyway. While India feels it must respond—rightly so as neighbor with political ties where our big parties Nepali Congress and the Communist Party, were founded in India, Nepal’s first elected PM, BP Koirala, had a long exile in political life in India with a different relationship to Indira Gandhi. China-Nepal ties are more political. There are people-to-people ties with borderland people, which I document in my new book coming out in December.

In terms of intimate people-to-people ties, 50 per cent or more Nepalese live in heartland north of India’s most populated region. Going north, Tibetan autonomous region is west of China’s Hu line, sparsely populated—94 per cent of the Chinese population lives in a small northeastern seaboard strip.

Given deep links between Indian and Nepali political classes, and Nepal Congress formed as National Congress offshoot—is there a role India can play like Nehru’s “Delhi Ccompromise” years back? Can India help bring peaceful political resolution?

Akhilesh: First qualifier—our Congress Party was not an offshoot of India’s Congress Party. This natural narrative from Indian pundits who think Nepal is so close we’re one of you, but we’re still sovereign nation. Small state citizens are very touchy about this. Whether India can help—first thing India or any big nation, the US or China, and institutions could do is not jump to the conclusion that monarchy return is a solution. It’s not, based on my analysis.

India could really help by nudging various forces together. Why? Because transition needs to be inclusive. If Delhi plays one against another, it’s not in Nepal’s or India’s interest. Don’t forget we have an open border—when People’s War was raging in Nepal, the biggest sufferer was India with massive immigration for safety. For India’s long-term interest, if India is seen asa  partner, quietly nudging disparate forces during extreme political and social stress, making transition shorter and smoother would be huge help. But India being seen as active player is always unhelpful because small states define national identity in terms of big powers next door.

Nepal is classic example. British India virtually ruled Nepal 104 years. Our Rana prime ministers would do anything for British power but got something in return. Britain was the first country to recognise Nepal as sovereign in 1923 when India was still under British rule. There’s always give-and-take with big powers. India could enormously help staying in background, nudging disparate players together, not taking active role or being seen taking active role. There’s lots of guessing games—will Yogi Adityanath be influential in Kathmandu given strong ties with Hindu constituencies, including Shah dynasty?

So monarchy return is linked to Hinduism revival and Yogi Adityanath?

Akhilesh: I’d put it this way—increasing numbers of Nepalese don’t see monarchy revival linked with reclaiming position as Sanatan Dharma nation. That’s more cultural identity while a section wants political identity, and that the BJP or RSS elements should have an active role in the transition.

Thank you both for this insightful discussion on Nepal’s political earthquake. We look forward to your book “In the Margins of Empires” from Penguin Random House in December.