OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication
draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Arndt Schwenkschuster , Pieter Kasselman , Scott Rose | ||
| Last updated | 2025-10-03 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
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draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-01
Web Authorization Protocol A. Schwenkschuster
Internet-Draft P. Kasselmann
Intended status: Standards Track SPIRL
Expires: 6 April 2026 S. Rose
NIST
3 October 2025
OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication
draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-01
Abstract
This specification profiles the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0
Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [RFC7521] and JWT
Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants
[RFC7523] to enable the use of SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Documents
(SVIDs) as client credentials in OAuth 2.0. It defines how OAuth
clients with SPIFFE credentials can authenticate to OAuth
authorization servers using their JWT-SVIDs or X.509-SVIDs without
the need for client secrets. This approach enhances security by
enabling seamless integration between SPIFFE-enabled workloads and
OAuth authorization servers while eliminating the need to distribute
and manage shared secrets such as static client secrets.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-
client-auth/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/arndt-s/oauth-spiffe-client-authentication.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. OAuth Client Authentication Using SPIFFE . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Client Authentication with JWT-SVIDs . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. JWT-SVID example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Client Authentication using X509-SVID . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. X509-SVID Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. SPIFFE Trust Establishment and Client Registration . . . . . 9
5. SPIFFE Key Distribution and Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Alternative methods to avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.1. SPIFFE Workload API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.2. Manual configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.3. Using the system trust store . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.4. Using the JWT-SVID iss claim . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-01 . . . . 17
A.2. draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-00 . . . . 17
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
Traditional OAuth client authentication typically relies on client
secrets or private key JWT authentication, both require an out of
band distribution of secret material to the OAuth client. In modern
cloud-native architectures where identity is managed by SPIFFE
(Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone), there is a need
to provision additional secret material for OAuth clients when
attested identifiers and credentials such as SVIDs are already
available.
This specification profiles the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0
Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [RFC7521] to allow
SPIFFE-enabled workloads to use their SPIFFE Verifiable Identity
Documents (SVIDs) — either X.509 certificates or JWT tokens — as
client credentials for OAuth 2.0 client authentication. JWT tokens
make use of the profiled version of [RFC7523] - the JWT Profile for
OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [RFC7523].
This profile focuses on using SPIFFE credentials for OAuth client
authentication.
The SPIFFE profile for client authentication enables seamless
integration between SPIFFE-based and OAuth-based systems, allowing
applications to leverage both ecosystems without requiring additional
credential management. It also enables a more secure authentication
method by leveraging cryptographically verifiable credentials rather
than shared secrets.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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2.1. Terminology
This specification uses the terms defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the
Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 [RFC7521], the JWT profile of it
[RFC7523], and the SPIFFE specifications. In particular, the
following terms are particularly relevant:
*Trust Domain*: As defined in SPIFFE; A trust domain represents a
single trust root. All SVIDs issued within a trust domain are
verifiable via the trust domain's keys.
*SPIFFE ID*: A unified resource identifier that uniquely and
specifically identifies a workload using the spiffe scheme. See
[SPIFFE_ID] for details.
*SVID*: A SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document. This document
specifies the use of two types of SVIDs:
* *X.509-SVID*: An X.509 certificate that contains a SPIFFE ID in
the URI SAN extension. See [SPIFFE_X509] for details.
* *JWT-SVID*: A JSON Web Token (JWT) that contains a SPIFFE ID in
the sub claim. See [SPIFFE_JWT] for details.
*SPIFFE Bundle*: A collection of public keys and associated metadata
that allow validation of SVIDs issued by a trust domain.
*SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint*: A URL that serves a SPIFFE bundle for a
trust domain.
3. OAuth Client Authentication Using SPIFFE
This section describes how SPIFFE identity documents can be used for
OAuth 2.0 client authentication, following the patterns established
in [RFC7521] and, in case of JWT-SVID [RFC7523].
OAuth 2.0 client authentication is used to authenticate the client to
the authorization server when making requests to the token endpoint.
When using SPIFFE for client authentication, the client presents its
SVID (either JWT-SVID or X.509-SVID) to prove its identity.
3.1. Client Authentication with JWT-SVIDs
JWT-SVID based authentication naturally follows the JWT Profile for
OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication [RFC7523], with specific adaptations
for SPIFFE JWT-SVIDs. [RFC7521] remains valid.
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To identify the assertion content as a JWT-SVID this specification
establishes the following client assertion type as an OAuth URI
according to [RFC6755]:
urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-spiffe
Based on [RFC7523] the following request parameters MUST be present
to perform client authentication in the context of this
specification:
* client_assertion_type: MUST be set to
urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-spiffe.
* client_assertion: MUST be a single SPIFFE JWT-SVID.
To validate JWT-SVID client authentication requests the authorization
server MUST:
1. Verify that the JWT is well-formed and contains all required
claims (SPIFFE ID in sub, aud, and exp).
2. Verify that the JWT has not expired (check the exp claim).
3. Verify that the aud claim contains only the issuer identifier of
the authorization server as its sole value. See
[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis] for details.
4. Verify the JWT signature using the signing keys of the trust
domains according to Section 5.
5. Verify that the SPIFFE ID in the sub claim matches a registered
client identifier or is associated with a registered client
identifier.
3.1.1. JWT-SVID example
The following examples illustrates an authorization_code request to
the token endpoint of an OAuth 2.0 authorization server leveraging a
SPIFFE JWT-SVID to authenticate the client.
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POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code&
code=n0esc3NRze7LTCu7iYzS6a5acc3f0ogp4&
client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
client-assertion-type%3Ajwt-spiffe&
client_assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjR2QzhhZ3ljSHU2cm5rRUVKWUFINlZ1Q2U0Sm9Ta1BWIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJhdWQiOlsiaHR0cHM6Ly9hcy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS90b2tlbiJdLCJleHAiOjE3NDcxMjQ1NDMsImlhdCI6MTc0NzEyNDI0Mywic3ViIjoic3BpZmZlOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcvbXktb2F1dGgtY2xpZW50In0.Xlv5lW4cbxDsQk4l0paewG4nXOR7MxF_FMn_c27DX45Bxr2HUZf9a6Untfq5S47xpwbw495HBL6_1Lc6TMJxmw
For clarify, the SPIFFE-JWT header and body decoded:
{
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "4vC8agycHu6rnkEEJYAH6VuCe4JoSkPV",
"typ": "JWT"
}.
{
"aud": [
"https://as.example.com/token"
],
"exp": 1747124543,
"iat": 1747124243,
"sub": "spiffe://example.org/my-oauth-client"
}
3.2. Client Authentication using X509-SVID
X.509-SVID based authentication uses mutual TLS as defined in OAuth
2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication [RFC8705], with specific
adaptations for SPIFFE X.509-SVIDs.
To authenticate using an X.509-SVID, the client establishes a mutual
TLS connection with the authorization server using its X.509-SVID as
the client certificate. The authorization server validates the
client certificate as an X.509-SVID and extracts the SPIFFE ID from
the URI SAN. The server certificate MUST be validated by the client
using its system trust store, and NOT the SPIFFE trust bundle.
The request MUST include the client_id parameter containing the
SPIFFE-ID of the client. It MUST match the URI SAN of the presented
X509-SVID client credential.
The server validates the client certificates according the following
rules
1. Perform standard X.509 path validation against the trust anchors
according to Section 5.
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2. Verify that the certificate contains exactly one URI SAN with a
valid SPIFFE ID.
3. Verify that the certificate is a leaf certificate (Basic
Constraints extension has CA=FALSE).
4. Verify that the certificate has the digitalSignature key usage
bit set.
5. Verify that the SPIFFE ID in the URI SAN matches a registered
client identifier or is associated with a registered client
identifier.
3.2.1. X509-SVID Example
The following request uses a refresh token to obtain a new access
token. The client is spiffe://example.org/my-oauth-client and is
authenticated by performing this request over a mutual TLS
connection.
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=refresh_token&
refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA&
client_id=spiffe://example.org/my-oauth-client
For clarity, the presented X509-SVID client certificate to the server
decoded via openssl x509 -text is:
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Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
dd:48:ec:d4:a4:c6:b2:ea:8e:9b:54:35:e8:30:65:7b
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, O=SPIFFE, serialNumber=6968729192859147614695638370388029008
Validity
Not Before: May 16 11:26:11 2025 GMT
Not After : May 16 12:26:21 2025 GMT
Subject: C=US, O=SPIRE
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:c2:0b:b6:8e:47:9a:20:ab:33:f1:a9:a5:77:97:
fa:a0:95:7d:2c:9f:e9:94:3d:e9:ed:e6:35:52:7f:
ff:82:34:74:20:97:5a:1b:4e:87:5f:32:3e:9d:da:
60:6a:05:8b:86:9d:0b:59:5f:67:be:93:3b:26:de:
ea:1e:18:98:96
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
D8:7A:2F:8B:E3:CF:08:83:EA:DD:5E:0A:59:33:6E:4C:E0:CC:6B:AD
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
C2:41:49:B0:ED:E0:94:7B:FA:7D:C2:F1:02:24:20:B9:1E:3D:56:FA
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
URI:spiffe://example.org/my-oauth-client
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
30:44:02:20:48:c3:5f:68:b2:c5:5d:96:c4:96:32:37:1f:af:
b8:1c:1c:45:ad:41:26:dd:e2:92:b5:73:62:83:34:c6:16:2a:
02:20:0f:48:02:8e:6b:1d:09:01:80:d8:85:2b:ca:25:c6:2c:
9e:f2:27:c2:3c:e4:03:58:a8:47:21:f6:3c:5e:7a:c8
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4. SPIFFE Trust Establishment and Client Registration
This specification requires previously established trust between the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server and the SPIFFE Trust Domain. This
needs to happen out of band and is not in scope of this
specification. However, the mechanisms of key distribution is in
scope and described in Section 5.
Similar to the trust establishment, corresponding OAuth clients need
to be established prior of using SPIFFE as client authentication.
This is also out of scope, implementors may for example choose to
leverage OAuth 2.0 dynamic client registration according to [RFC7591]
or configure them out of band.
5. SPIFFE Key Distribution and Validation
This section describes how an authorization server verifies the
signature of an X509 or JWT-SVID. It recommends two SPIFFE-native
approaches.
Trust bundles in general MUST be keyed by the trust domain identifier
to prevent mix up between trust domain and their corresponding
bundles. The 2 approaches can be used in conjunction, for instance:
Trust domain "example.org": Workload API at unix:///var/secrets/spiffe/agent.sock
Trust domain "production": SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint at https://example.com/auth/spiffe/bundle.json
5.1. SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint
The SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint exposes the signing keys for X509-SVIDs
and JWT-SVIDs over HTTP via a JSON Web Key Set according to
[RFC7517].
Server authentication on this endpoint is available in two flavors.
For the sake of interoperability, in the context of this
specification the WebPKI flavor MUST be used. This effectively means
that the server certificate of the bundle endpoint is trusted by the
authorization server accessing it. See Sec 5.2.1 of
[SPIFFE_FEDERATION] for details.
The authorization server SHOULD periodically poll the bundle endpoint
to retrieve updated trust bundles, following the refresh hint and
period provided in the bundle. See [SPIFFE_FEDERATION] for details.
The SPIFFE bundle endpoint cannot be derived from the JWT-SVID and
X509-SVID and MUST be configured manually out of band. Bundle
endpoints MUST be keyed by the trust domain identifier.
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5.1.1. Example
The following examples showcase how the Authorization Server can
perform key discovery for the trust domain example.org. Important to
note is the difference between example.org trust domain and
example.com location for the SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint. This highlights
the importance of explicit configuration and undermines the fact that
the SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint cannot be derived or discovered from the
X509-SVID without explicit configuration.
Example configuration at the OAuth Authorization Server in the JSON
format
{
"example.org": {
"spiffe_bundle_endpoint": {
"url": "https://example.com/bundle.json"
}
}
}
Note difference between example.org and example.com
Example SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint request, response:
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GET /bundle.json HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
{
"keys": [
{
"use": "x509-svid",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"x": "9XBzty8W_ex4Xr0RdzUBgie_okdaUTheSF0PQvVAaTsXaP1J7yv0Dhlaw45I7Cv9",
"y": "HP21HOmMxIlZ0XeqsOl9sM5H57HBQWu0bINXfw4jdeHdB5vk1XyNyBQQxeUpSxhn",
"x5c": [
"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"
]
},
{
"use": "jwt-svid",
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "6d02Vc2oU62mXVH5nlggHGLmfIhrlnNW",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "S2V42XlFjNp30CFmOidbWQT9IpZHqJ8JuuJgDBvkdZA",
"y": "vN0y5TK36VRxZo_E3Gc7S5c0jIRIaHZ53f2UiJ1NFto"
}
],
"spiffe_sequence": 10,
"spiffe_refresh_hint": 300
}
The use parameter in the JSON Web Key indicates the credential
format the key is indended for. Multiple keys of the same use can
be present.
The X509-SVID signing certificate (.keys[0].x5c[0] from response
above) in text form:
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Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
5c:4b:d5:2d:f9:c1:6e:78:2c:32:a6:bb:6c:73:f0:b8:f4:be:13:09
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA512
Issuer: C=US, O=SPIFFE
Validity
Not Before: May 16 11:23:19 2025 GMT
Not After : May 15 11:23:19 2030 GMT
Subject: C=US, O=SPIFFE
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (384 bit)
pub:
04:ef:3f:db:67:2b:e8:5c:a1:64:23:e7:f2:fd:f0:
3b:16:55:68:17:55:17:d4:bd:cd:6d:04:fd:cc:8f:
99:31:f7:8c:ac:b0:1e:31:60:18:45:32:8b:a1:17:
4b:2f:01:75:27:6c:3f:c3:a5:b9:da:56:fb:29:54:
63:cb:08:96:81:35:0e:96:04:03:40:fe:51:0d:26:
da:d5:99:6c:8f:c2:45:43:cb:2c:b4:8d:9b:68:78:
9f:c0:2d:68:36:b8:5e
ASN1 OID: secp384r1
NIST CURVE: P-384
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
8D:79:D2:26:5E:4C:83:30:40:C7:E9:1D:E1:35:12:F6:60:CF:0B:DB
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
URI:spiffe://example.org
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA512
Signature Value:
30:64:02:30:0a:e9:fd:d4:cd:99:52:90:cb:14:86:93:4e:f8:
02:52:d6:17:12:9f:2e:65:99:0e:38:b6:b9:a6:fe:43:0f:60:
30:04:87:ec:24:20:80:a4:75:ee:3c:ad:9d:a2:72:0d:02:30:
55:93:0e:14:8c:47:47:3b:74:7c:a7:2a:2a:96:1d:a4:85:46:
4f:3f:95:a4:c2:ab:3c:2e:04:b3:1b:cf:02:0f:33:fc:dd:dc:
d5:2f:44:c8:2a:dc:ce:3f:c5:c6:89:d0
Arndt: Bundle doesn't match X509-SVID. This needs to be fixed.
5.2. Alternative methods to avoid
The following key distribution mechanisms are alternatives and SHOULD
be avoided for interopability reasons.
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5.2.1. SPIFFE Workload API
The SPIFFE Workload API allows workloads to retrieve a trust bundle.
It requires the authorization server to be part of a SPIFFE trust
domain and be considered a workload within it. The SPIFFE Workload
API is build in a way that the workload proactively retrieves trust
bundles updates and does not need to poll them, which reduces the
time to distribute them. In addition to the trust bundle of the
trust domain the workload resides in, the SPIFFE Workload API also
allows to retrieve trust bundles from federated trust domains.
This approach is NOT RECOMMENDED for OAuth SPIFFE Client
Authentication for several reasons:
* OAuth Authorization Server needs to be a workload within a SPIFFE
trust domain, which is a significant limitation for deployment
scenarios.
* Federated trust domain bundles create ambiguity about how they are
handled. When distributed via the SPIFFE Workload API the trust
relationship and points where they are established become
ambiguous.
5.2.2. Manual configuration
In small, static environments the authorization server MAY be
configured with the SPIFFE bundles manually. This approach requires
human interaction to set up, rotate and manage keying material and is
thus generally NOT RECOMMENDED.
5.2.3. Using the system trust store
X509-SVIDs MUST NOT be validated using the system trust store. The
SPIFFE ID carried in the URI SAN is rarely a verifiable attribute in
the broader X.509 ecosystem. Using the system trust store as trust
anchor would allow ANY certificate authority in it to issue a trusted
X509-SVID for ANY SPIFFE ID. In comparison: using SPIFFE-native
validation methods restricts the signing of SPIFFE-IDs to the
corresponding trust domain signing keys.
5.2.4. Using the JWT-SVID iss claim
JWT-SVIDs carrying iss claims could technically be validated by
retrieving the signing keys via OpenID Connect Discovery or OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata. This approach only applies for JWT-
SVIDs and only works when the iss claim is present, which is not
guaranteed and not part of the JWT-SVID specification.
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The narrow scope of applicability does not make it a viable
alternative to the SPIFFE Bundle Endpoint. In combination with
interoperability concerns, this approach is NOT RECOMMENDED.
6. Implementation Status
// Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section, as well as the
// reference to RFC 7942, before publication. This section records
the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this
specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is
based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of
implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its
decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that
the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply
endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to
verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF
contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to
be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.
Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
Keycloak
* Organization: Red Hat / CNCF
* Maturity: preview
* Coverage: JWT-SVID client authentication using SPIFFE Trust Bundle
Endpoint
* Contact: Keycloak community & maintainers
(https://www.keycloak.org/community)
7. Security Considerations
Client authentication using JWT-SVIDs has the same security
considerations as described in [RFC6749] and [RFC7521].
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Client authentication using X509-SVIDs has the same security
considerations as described in [RFC8705]. The validation rules in
section 3.2 protect against an OAuth2 token being issued (or being
issued incorrectly) to a client that did not present an appropriate
X509-SVID.
The issues described in Section 5.2 above include the threat that an
authorization server may have the incorrect trust stores configured
to validate the client SVID. This could result in an incorrectly
issued token to an attacker if the attacker is able to obtain a
certificate that can be validated by one of the misconfigured trust
anchors in the trust store.
8. IANA Considerations
This document requests a new entry to be added to the Oauth URI
registry found at https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/
oauth-parameters.xhtml#uri (https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-
parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#uri). The registration process is
defined in [RFC6755]. This document requests the following entry to
be added to the registry:
* URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-spiffe
* Common Name: SPIFFE JWT-SVID Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client
Authentication
* Change Controller: IETF
* Reference: This Document
9. Normative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis]
Jones, M. B., Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and F. Skokan,
"Updates to Audience Values for OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-rfc7523bis-02, 22 July 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
rfc7523bis-02>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6755>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7521>.
[RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7591>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
[SPIFFE_BUNDLE]
"SPIFFE Bundle", n.d.,
<https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/
SPIFFE_Trust_Domain_and_Bundle.md#4-spiffe-bundle-format>.
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[SPIFFE_FEDERATION]
"SPIFFE Federation", n.d.,
<https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/
SPIFFE_Federation.md>.
[SPIFFE_ID]
"SPIFFE-ID", n.d.,
<https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/
SPIFFE-ID.md>.
[SPIFFE_JWT]
"JWT-SVID", n.d.,
<https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/JWT-
SVID.md>.
[SPIFFE_X509]
"X509-SVID", n.d.,
<https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/
X509-SVID.md>.
Appendix A. Document History
// RFC Editor: please remove before publication.
A.1. draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-01
* Rephrase introduction to make the focus on client authentication
more clear.
* Add implementation section.
* Add audience restrictions from RFC7523bis adopted WG document.
* Add security and IANA considerations section.
* Add Scott Rose as co-author.
A.2. draft-schwenkschuster-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-00
* Initial document
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.
Authors' Addresses
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Arndt Schwenkschuster
SPIRL
Email: arndts.ietf@gmail.com
Pieter Kasselmann
SPIRL
Email: pieter@spirl.com
Scott Rose
NIST
Email: scott.rose@nist.gov
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