A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-16
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (anima WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Kent Watsen , Michael Richardson , Max Pritikin , Toerless Eckert , Qiufang Ma | ||
| Last updated | 2025-10-20 | ||
| Replaces | draft-richardson-anima-rfc8366bis | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Yang Validation | 6 errors, 0 warnings | ||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | Sheng Jiang | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | ludwig@clemm.org, shengjiang@bupt.edu.cn |
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-16
ANIMA Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks
Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson
Expires: 23 April 2026 Sandelman Software
M. Pritikin
Cisco Systems
T. Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc.
Q. Ma
Huawei
20 October 2025
A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-16
Abstract
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a Pledge to an
owner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the
Pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher".
This document defines an artifact format as a YANG-defined JSON or
CBOR document that has been signed using a variety of cryptographic
systems.
The voucher artifact is normally generated by the Pledge's
manufacturer (i.e., the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority
(MASA)).
This document updates RFC8366, includes a number of desired
extensions into the YANG. The voucher request defined in RFC8995 is
also now included in this document, as well as other YANG extensions
needed for variants of BRSKI/RFC8995.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group
mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima/.
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/anima-wg/voucher.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Survey of Voucher Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Changes since RFC8366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Attempts and motivation to extend RFC8366 . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Informational Model changes since RFC8366 . . . . . . . . 10
6. Signature mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. CMS Format Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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7.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.4. ietf-voucher SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.5. Voucher Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.6. Manufacturer Private extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Voucher Request Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.2. "ietf-voucher-request" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.3. ietf-voucher-request SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.1. Renewals Instead of Revocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.2. Voucher Per Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10.1. Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing . . . . . 34
10.4. YANG Module Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 34
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
11.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
11.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
11.3. The Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
11.4. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . 36
11.5. Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.1. Key pairs associated with examples . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2. Example CMS signed voucher request . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.3. Example CMS signed voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.4. Example JWS signed voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 49
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1. Introduction
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a candidate
device (Pledge) to an owner using an artifact signed, directly or
indirectly, by the Pledge's manufacturer, i.e., the Manufacturer
Authorized Signing Authority (MASA). This artifact is known as the
"voucher".
The voucher artifact is a JSON [RFC8259] document that conforms with
a data model described by YANG [RFC7950]. It may also be serialized
to CBOR [CBOR]. It is encoded using the rules defined in [RFC7951]
or [RFC9254], and is signed using (by default) a CMS structure
[RFC5652].
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The primary purpose of a voucher is to securely convey a trust anchor
that a Pledge can use to authenticate subsequent interactions. The
trust anchor may be in the form of a certificate (the "pinned-domain-
cert" attribute), a hash of a certificate, or it can be a raw public
key (in constrained use cases).
This trust anchor represents the authority of the owner of a network.
Communicating this trust anchor securely to the Pledge is the job of
the voucher artifact. The act of communicating this trust anchor is
known as pinning the trust anchor, as the Pledge can then use the
resulting anchor to authenticate other actors who are part of the
network. The collection of all these actors is collectively known as
the network domain. (This is not related to the domain name system,
but rather the term is of mathematical origin)
A voucher may be useful in several contexts, but the driving
motivation herein is to support secure onboarding mechanisms. This
is accomplished by assigning an owner to the Pledge, enabling it to
authenticate the network that it is connected to.
[RFC8366] originally defined just the voucher artifact, leaving the
Voucher Request artifiact that is important to BRSKI to be defined in
[BRSKI]. This document includes both Voucher and Voucher-Request,
and therefore updates [BRSKI].
YANG is not easily extended except by updating the YANG definition.
Since [RFC8366] was written, the pattern is to publish YANG modules
as two documents: one with only the YANG module, and the other one
with usage, motivation and further explanation. This allows the YANG
module to be updated without replacing all of the context. This
document does not follow that pattern, but future updates may update
only the YANG.
This document also introduces an experimental mechanism to support
future extensions without requiring the YANG module to be replaced.
This includes both new IETF Standard mechanisms, as well as a
facility for manufacturer private extensions.
The lifetimes of vouchers may vary. In some onboarding protocols,
the vouchers may include a nonce restricting them to a single use,
whereas the vouchers in other onboarding protocols may have an
indicated lifetime. In order to support long lifetimes, this
document recommends using short lifetimes with programmatic renewal,
see Section 9.1.
Some onboarding protocols using the voucher artifact defined in this
document include: [ZERO-TOUCH], [SECUREJOIN], [BRSKI] and [cBRSKI].
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2. Terminology
This document uses the following terms:
(Voucher) Artifact: Used throughout to represent the voucher as
instantiated in the form of a signed datastructure.
Bootstrapping: The process where a Pledge obtains cryptographic key
material to identify and trust future interactions within a
specific domain network. Based on imprinted key material provided
during the manufacturing process (see: Imprint).
Domain: The set of entities or infrastructure under common
administrative control. The goal of the onboarding protocol is to
enable a Pledge to join a domain and obtain domain specific
security credentials.
Imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key
material to identify and trust future interactions generally as
part of the manufacturing. This term is taken from Konrad
Lorenz's work in biology with new ducklings: "during a critical
period, the duckling would assume that anything that looks like a
mother duck is in fact their mother" [Stajano99theresurrecting].
An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint of the
manufacturer's root certification authority (root ca) certificate.
A device that imprints on an attacker suffers a similar fate to a
duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf. Imprinting is a term
from psychology and ethology, as described in [imprinting].
Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain
that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new
device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the
domain interfaces with a join registrar (and Coordinator) to
control this process. Typically, a join registrar is "inside" its
domain. For simplicity, this document often refers to this as
just "registrar".
MASA (Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority): The entity that,
for the purpose of this document, issues and signs the vouchers
for a manufacturer's Pledges. In some onboarding protocols, the
MASA may have an Internet presence and be integral to the
onboarding process, whereas in other protocols the MASA may be an
offline service that has no active role in the onboarding process.
Malicious Registrar: An on-path active attacker that presents itself
as a legitimate registrar, but which is in fact under the control
of an attacker.
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Onboarding: Onboarding describes the process to provide necessary
operational data to a Pledge and to complete the process of
bringing the Pledge into an operational state. This data may be
configuration data, or also application-specific cryptographic key
material (application-specific security credentials).
Owner: The entity that controls the private key of the trust anchor
conveyed by the voucher. Typically, this is indicated by the
"pinned-domain-cert" data item.
Pledge: The prospective component/device attempting to find and
securely join a domain. When shipped or in factory reset mode, it
only trusts authorized representatives of the manufacturer.
Registrar: See join registrar.
TOFU (Trust on First Use): When a Pledge makes no security decisions
but rather simply trusts the first domain entity it is contacted
by. Used similarly to [RFC7435]. This is also known as the
"resurrecting duckling" model.
Voucher: A short form for Voucher Artifact. It refers to the signed
statement from the MASA service that indicates to a Pledge the
cryptographic identity of the domain it should trust. When
clarity is needed, it may be preceeded by the type of the
signature, such as CMS, JWS or COSE.
Voucher Data: The raw (serialized) representation of the YANG
without any enclosing signature. Current formats include JSON and
CBOR.
Voucher Request: A signed artifact sent from the Pledge to the
Registrar, or from the Registrar to the MASA for Voucher
acquisition.
Pledge Voucher Request (PVR): A signed artifact sent from the Pledge
to the Registrar. It is a specific form of Voucher Request.
Registrar Voucher Request (RVR): A signed artifact sent from the
Registrar to the MASA. It is a specific form of Voucher Request.
3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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4. Survey of Voucher Types
A voucher is a cryptographically protected statement to the Pledge
authorizing a zero-touch onboarding with the join registrar of the
domain. The specific information a voucher provides is influenced by
the onboarding use case.
The voucher can convey the following information to the join
registrar and Pledge:
Assertion Basis: Indicates the method that protects the onboarding
(this is distinct from the voucher signature that protects the
voucher itself). Methods include manufacturer-asserted ownership
verification, assured logging operations, or reliance on Pledge
behavior such as secure or measured boot. The join registrar uses
this information to make a determination as to whether to accept
the Pledge into the network. Only some methods are normatively
defined in this document. Other methods are left for future work.
Authentication of Join Registrar: Indicates how the Pledge can
authenticate the join registrar. This document defines a
mechanism to pin the domain certificate, or a raw public key.
Pinning a symmetric key, or "CN-ID" or "DNS-ID" information (as
defined in [RFC6125]) is left for future work.
Anti-Replay Protections: Time- or nonce-based information to
constrain the voucher to time periods or bootstrapping attempts.
A number of onboarding scenarios can be met using differing
combinations of this information. All scenarios address the primary
threat of an on-path active attacker (or MiTM) impersonating the
registrar. If successful, this would gain control over the Pledge.
The following combinations are "types" of vouchers:
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+=========+===========+========+===========+========+========+=====+
|Voucher | Assertion | | Registrar | |Validity| |
|Type | | | ID | | | |
+=========+===========+========+===========+========+========+=====+
| | Logged |Verified| Trust |CN-ID or| RTC|Nonce|
| | | | Anchor | DNS-ID| | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Audit | X | | X | | | X|
|voucher | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Nonceless| X | | X | | X| |
|Audit | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Owner | X | X| X | | X| X|
|Audit | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Owner ID | | X| X | X| X| |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Bearer | X | | wildcard |wildcard|optional| opt|
|voucher | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
Table 1: Overview of voucher types
NOTE: All voucher types include a 'Pledge ID serial-number' (not
shown here for space reasons).
Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher is named after the logging assertion
mechanisms that the registrar then "audits" to enforce local
policy. The registrar mitigates a malicious registrar by auditing
that an unknown malicious registrar does not appear in the log
entries. This does not directly prevent a malicious registrar but
provides a response mechanism that ensures the on-path-attack is
unsuccessful. An advantage is that actual ownership knowledge
(i.e., sales integration providing an indication of who purchased
the device) is not required on the MASA service.
Nonceless Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher with a validity period
statement, but no guarantee of freshness. Fundamentally, it is
the same as an Audit Voucher except that it can be issued in
advance to support network partitions or to provide a permanent
voucher for remote deployments. Being issued in advance of the
Pledge being online, the Pledge can not rely on a nonce to be
included for freshness. This compromise in reducing the freshness
allows for the resulting voucher can be carried across air-gapped
infrastructure. In addition, as there is no end to the validity
period, the voucher can be used after the manufacturer (and its
delegates) has gone out of business.
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Ownership Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher where the MASA service has
verified the registrar as the authorized owner. The MASA service
mitigates a MiTM registrar by refusing to generate Audit Vouchers
for unauthorized registrars. The registrar uses audit techniques
to supplement the MASA. This provides an ideal sharing of policy
decisions and enforcement between the vendor and the owner.
Ownership ID Voucher: Named after inclusion of the Pledge's CN-ID or
DNS-ID within the voucher. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM
registrar by identifying the specific registrar (via WebPKI)
authorized to own the Pledge.
Bearer Voucher: A Bearer Voucher is named after the inclusion of a
registrar ID wildcard. Because the registrar identity is not
indicated, this voucher type must be treated as a secret and
protected from exposure as any 'bearer' of the voucher can claim
the Pledge. This variation is included in the above table in
order to clearly show how other voucher types differ. This
specification does not support bearer vouchers at this time.
There are other specifications in the industry which are
equivalent though. Publishing a nonceless bearer voucher
effectively turns the specified pledge into a "TOFU" device with
minimal mitigation against MiTM registrars. Bearer vouchers are
therefore out of scope.
5. Changes since RFC8366
5.1. Attempts and motivation to extend RFC8366
[RFC8366] was published in 2018 during the development of [BRSKI],
[ZERO-TOUCH] and other work-in-progress efforts. Since then the
industry has matured significantly, and the in-the-field activity
which this document supports has become known as _onboarding_ rather
than _bootstrapping_.
The focus of [BRSKI] was onboarding of ISP and Enterprise owned wired
routing and switching equipment, with IoT devices being a less
important aspect. [ZERO-TOUCH] has focused upon onboarding of CPE
equipment like cable modems and other larger IoT devices, again with
smaller IoT devices being of less import.
Since [BRSKI] was published there is now a mature effort to do
application-level onboarding of constrained IoT devices defined by
the Thread Group and the Fairhair Alliance (now OCF) [fairhair]. The
[cBRSKI] document has defined a version of [BRSKI] that is useable
over constrained IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN networks using CoAP and DTLS,
while [I-D.ietf-lake-authz] provides for using CoAP and EDHOC on even
more constrained devices with very constrained networks.
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[PRM] has created a new methodology for onboarding that does not
depend upon a synchronous connection between the Pledge and the
Registrar. This mechanism uses a mobile Registrar Agent that works
to collect and transfer signed artifacts via physical travel from one
network to another.
Both [cBRSKI] and [PRM] require extensions to the Voucher Request and
the resulting Voucher. The new attribtes are required to carry the
additional attributes and describe the extended semantics. In
addition [cBRSKI] uses the serialization mechanism described in
[RFC9254] to produce significantly more compact artifacts.
When the process to define [cBRSKI] and [PRM] was started, there was
a belief that the appropriate process was to use the [RFC8040]
_augment_ mechanism to further extend both the voucher request
[BRSKI] and voucher [RFC8366] artifacts. However, [PRM] needs to
extend an enumerated type with additional values and _augment_ can
not do this, so that was initially the impetus for this document.
An attempt was then made to determine what would happen if one wanted
to have a constrained version of the [PRM] voucher artifact. The
result was invalid YANG, with multiple definitions of the core
attributes from the [RFC8366] voucher artifact. After some
discussion, it was determined that the _augment_ mechanism did not
work, nor did it work better when [RFC8040] yang-data was replaced
with the [RFC8791] structure mechanisms.
After significant discussion the decision was made to simply roll all
of the needed extensions into this document.
5.2. Informational Model changes since RFC8366
This document therefore represents a merge of YANG definitions from
[RFC8366], the voucher-request from [BRSKI], and extensions to each
of these from [cBRSKI], [CLOUD] and [PRM]. The difficulty with this
approach is that the semantics of the definitions needed for the
other documents is not included in this document, but rather in the
respective other documents.
6. Signature mechanisms
Three signature systems have been defined for vouchers and voucher-
requests.
[cBRSKI] defines a mechanism that uses COSE RFC9052, with the voucher
data encoded using [RFC9254]. However, as the SID process requires
up-to-date YANG, the SID values for this mechanism are presented in
this document.
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[jBRSKI] defines a mechanism that uses JSON [RFC8259] and [JWS].
The CMS signing mechanism first defined in [RFC8366] continues to be
defined here.
6.1. CMS Format Voucher Artifact
The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS [RFC5652]. A CMS-signed voucher,
the default type, contains a ContentInfo structure with the voucher
content. An OID for JSON-encoded voucher is allocated in
Section 11.4, and it is to be placed in the eContentType field in the
ContentInfo.
The signing structure is a CMS SignedData structure, as specified by
Section 5.1 of [RFC5652], encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding
Rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690 [ITU-T.X690.2015].
[RFC5652] mandates that SignedAttributes MUST be present when the
content type is not id-data. This mitigates attacks on CMS as
described in [I-D.vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata]. Decoders
MUST verify that SignedAttributes are present.
To facilitate interoperability, Section 11.3 the media type
"application/voucher-cms+json" and the filename extension ".vcj" were
registered by [RFC8366].
The CMS structure MUST contain a 'signerInfo' structure, as described
in Section 5.1 of [RFC5652], containing the signature generated over
the content using a private key trusted by the recipient. Normally,
the recipient is the Pledge and the signer is the MASA. In the
Voucher Request, the signer is the Pledge, or the Registrar.
Note that Section 5.1 of [RFC5652] includes a discussion about how to
validate a CMS object, which is really a PKCS7 object (cmsVersion=1).
Intermediate systems (such the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures [BRSKI] registrar) that might need to evaluate the
voucher in flight MUST be prepared for such an older format. No
signaling of the format version is necessary, as the manufacturer
knows the capabilities of the Pledge and will use an appropriate
format voucher for each Pledge.
The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all of the certificates leading
up to and including the signer's trust anchor certificate known to
the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many
applications, but third parties cannot accurately audit the
transaction without it.
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The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any
intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between the voucher issuer
and the trust anchor known to the recipient. However, the use of
CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the Pledge is
unlikely to be able to perform online checks and is unlikely to have
a trusted clock source. As described below, the use of short-lived
vouchers and/or a Pledge-provided nonce provides a freshness
guarantee.
7. Voucher Artifact
The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a Pledge to an
owner. The voucher informs the Pledge which entity it should
consider to be its owner.
This document defines a voucher that is JSON-encoded, and CMS signed
encoding of the data defined in the YANG module Section 7.3. Also,
this document defines voucher data that is CBOR-encoded based on the
same YANG model. The CBOR-encoded (signed) voucher based on this
CBOR voucher data is defined in [cBRSKI].
The voucher data format is described here as a practical basis for
some uses (such as in NETCONF), but more to clearly indicate what
vouchers look like in practice. This description also serves to
validate the YANG data model.
[RFC8366] defined a media type and a filename extension for the CMS-
encoded JSON type. The media type for JOSE format vouchers is
defined in [jBRSKI] and the media type for COSE format vouchers is
defined in [cBRSKI]. Both include respective filename extensions.
The Media Type is used by the Pledge (requesting to the Registrar)
and by the Registrar (requesting to the MASA) to signal what voucher
format is expected. Other aspects of the voucher, such as it being
nonce-less or which kind of pinned anchor is used, is not part of the
Media Type.
Only the format of voucher that is expected is signaled in the form
of a (MIME) Media Content-Type in the HTTP Accept: header.
For vouchers stored/transferred via methods like a USB storage device
(USB key), the voucher format is usually signaled by a filename
extension.
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7.1. Tree Diagram
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a voucher
document. The notation used in this diagram is described in
[RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG
module in Section 7.3. Please review the YANG module for a detailed
description of the voucher format.
module: ietf-voucher
structure voucher:
+-- voucher
+-- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- extensions* union
+-- manufacturer-private? binary
+-- assertion? enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- (pinning)?
| +--:(pinned-domain-cert)
| | +-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
| +--:(pinned-domain-pubk)
| | +-- pinned-domain-pubk? binary
| +--:(pinned-domain-pubk-sha256)
| +-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+-- (nonceless)?
| +--:(expires-on)
| | +-- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(nonce)
| +-- nonce? binary
+-- est-domain? ietf:uri
+-- additional-configuration-url? ietf:uri
7.2. Examples
This section provides voucher data examples for illustration
purposes. These examples conform to the encoding rules defined in
[RFC8259].
The following example illustrates an ephemeral voucher (uses a
nonce). The MASA generated this voucher using the 'logged' assertion
type, knowing that it would be suitable for the Pledge making the
request.
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{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "logged",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
The following example illustrates a non-ephemeral voucher (no nonce).
While the voucher itself expires after two weeks, it presumably can
be renewed for up to a year. The MASA generated this voucher using
the 'verified' assertion type, which should satisfy all Pledges.
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"expires-on": "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "verified",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"domain-cert-revocation-checks": true,
"last-renewal-date": "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z"
}
}
[jBRSKI], Section 8 contains examples of vouchers encoded in JSON,
and signed with [JWS]. [cBRSKI], Section 9 contains examples of
vouchers encoded in CBOR, and signed with [COSE].
7.3. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS>
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
module ietf-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher";
prefix vch;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
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import ietf-inet-types {
prefix ietf;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx;
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Max Pritikin
<mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>
Author: Toerless Eckert
<mailto:tte@cs.fau.de>
Author: Qiufang Ma
<mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>";
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher, which is
produced by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA)
to securely assign a pledge to an 'owner', so that the
pledge may establish a secure connection to the owner's
network infrastructure.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.
RFCEDITOR: please replace XXXX with the RFC number assigned.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
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NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2023-01-10 {
description
"updated to support new assertion enumerated type";
reference
"RFC XXXX Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
grouping voucher-artifact-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
container voucher {
description
"A voucher assigns a pledge to an owner using
the (pinned-domain-cert) value.";
leaf created-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"A value indicating the date this voucher was created.
This node is primarily for human consumption and auditing.
Future work MAY create verification requirements based on
this node.";
}
leaf-list extensions {
type union {
type uint64; // when serialized to CBOR with SID
type string; // when serialized to CBOR or JSON
}
description
"A list of extension names that are used in this Voucher
file. Each name is registered with the IANA. Standard
extensions are described in an RFC, while vendor \
proprietary
ones are not.";
}
leaf manufacturer-private {
type binary;
description
"In CBOR serialization, this is a CBOR bstr containing \
any valid CBOR that
the manufacturer wishes to share with it's Pledge. In \
JSON serializations,
this contains additional JSON instead, and it is \
base64URL encoded.";
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}
leaf assertion {
type enumeration {
enum verified {
value 0;
description
"Indicates that the ownership has been positively
verified by the MASA (e.g., through sales channel
integration).";
}
enum logged {
value 1;
description
"Indicates that the voucher has been issued after
minimal verification of ownership or control. The
issuance has been logged for detection of
potential security issues (e.g., recipients of
vouchers might verify for themselves that unexpected
vouchers are not in the log). This is similar to
unsecured trust-on-first-use principles but with the
logging providing a basis for detecting unexpected
events.";
}
enum proximity {
value 2;
description
"Indicates that the voucher has been issued after
the MASA verified a proximity proof provided by the
device and target domain. The issuance has been
logged for detection of potential security issues.";
}
enum agent-proximity {
value 3;
description
"Mostly identical to proximity, but
indicates that the voucher has been issued
after the MASA has verified a statement that
a registrar agent has made contact with the device.";
}
}
description
"The assertion is a statement from the MASA regarding how
the owner was verified. This statement enables pledges
to support more detailed policy checks. Pledges MUST
ensure that the assertion provided is acceptable, per
local policy, before processing the voucher.";
}
leaf serial-number {
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type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The serial-number of the hardware. When processing a
voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its serial-number
matches this value. If no match occurs, then the
pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.";
}
leaf idevid-issuer {
type binary;
description
"The Authority Key Identifier OCTET STRING (as defined in
Section 4.2.1.1 of RFC 5280) from the pledge's IDevID
certificate. Optional since some serial-numbers are
already unique within the scope of a MASA.
Inclusion of the statistically unique key identifier
ensures statistically unique identification of the
hardware.
When processing a voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its
IDevID Authority Key Identifier matches this value. If no
match occurs, then the pledge MUST NOT process this
voucher.
When issuing a voucher, the MASA MUST ensure that this
field is populated for serial-numbers that are not
otherwise unique within the scope of the MASA.";
}
choice pinning {
description
"One of these attributes is used by the pledge to
specify the registrar, and how the pledge would like
the registrar's identity to be pinned";
leaf pinned-domain-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
RFC 5280, using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
encoding, as defined in ITU-T X.690.
This certificate is used by a pledge to trust a Public \
Key
Infrastructure in order to verify a domain certificate
supplied to the pledge separately by the bootstrapping
protocol. The domain certificate MUST have this
certificate somewhere in its chain of certificates.
This certificate MAY be an end-entity certificate,
including a self-signed entity.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
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Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf pinned-domain-pubk {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-pubk may replace the
pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher. The pinned-domain-pubk
is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.
This field is encoded as a Subject Public Key Info block
as specified in RFC7250, in section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";
}
leaf pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 is a second
alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted
during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specification which can define a new leaf for another
hash type.";
}
}
leaf domain-cert-revocation-checks {
type boolean;
description
"A processing instruction to the pledge that it MUST (true)
or MUST NOT (false) verify the revocation status for the
pinned domain certificate. If this field is not set, then
normal PKIX behavior applies to validation of the domain
certificate.";
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}
leaf last-renewal-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
// this does not work, the XPath does not evaluate
// must '../nonceless/expires-on';
description
"The date that the MASA projects to be the last date it
will renew a voucher on. This field is merely
informative; it is not processed by pledges.
Circumstances may occur after a voucher is generated that
may alter a voucher's validity period. For instance,
a vendor may associate validity periods with support
contracts, which may be terminated or extended
over time.";
}
choice nonceless {
description
"Either a nonce must be present, or an expires-on header";
leaf expires-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"A value indicating when this voucher expires. The \
node is
optional as not all pledges support expirations, such as
pledges lacking a reliable clock.
If this field exists, then the pledges MUST ensure that
the expires-on time has not yet passed. A pledge without
an accurate clock cannot meet this requirement.
The expires-on value MUST NOT exceed the expiration date
of any of the listed 'pinned-domain-cert' certificates.\
";
}
leaf nonce {
type binary {
length "8..32";
}
description
"A value that can be used by a pledge in some \
bootstrapping
protocols to enable anti-replay protection. This node \
is
optional because it is not used by all bootstrapping
protocols.
When present, the pledge MUST compare the provided nonce
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value with another value that the pledge randomly
generated and sent to a bootstrap server in an earlier
bootstrapping message. If the value is present, but
the values do not match, then the pledge MUST NOT \
process
this voucher.";
}
}
leaf est-domain {
type ietf:uri;
description
"The est-domain is a URL from which the Pledge should
continue doing enrollment rather than with the
Cloud Registrar.
The pinned-domain-cert contains a trust-anchor
which is to be used to authenticate the server
found at this URI.
";
}
leaf additional-configuration-url {
type ietf:uri;
description
"The additional-configuration attribute contains a
URL to which the Pledge can retrieve additional
configuration information.
The contents of this URL are manufacturer specific.
This is intended to do things like configure
a VoIP phone to point to the correct hosted
PBX, for example.";
}
}
}
// Top-level statement
sx:structure voucher {
uses voucher-artifact-grouping;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
7.4. ietf-voucher SID values
[RFC9254] explains how to serialize YANG into CBOR, and for this a
series of SID values are required. While [CORESID] defines the
management process for these values, due to the immaturity of the
tooling around this YANG-SID mechanism, the following values are
considered normative.
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SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2451 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher
2452 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/assertion
2453 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/created-on
2454 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2455 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/expires-on
2456 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/idevid-issuer
2457 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/last-renewal-date
2458 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/nonce
2459 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/pinned-domain-cert
2460 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/pinned-domain-pubk
2461 data .../pinned-domain-pubk-sha256
2462 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/serial-number
2463 data .../additional-configuration-url
2464 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/est-domain
2465 data .../manufacturer-private
2466 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/voucher/extensions
The "assertion" attribute is an enumerated type in [RFC8366], but no
values were provided as part of the enumeration. This document
provides enumerated values as part of the YANG module.
In the JSON serialization, the literal strings from the enumerated
types are used so there is no ambiguity.
In the CBOR serialization, a small integer is used, and the
enumeration values are repeated here for convenience. However, the
YANG module should be considered authoritative. No IANA registry is
provided or necessary because the YANG module (and this document)
would be extended when there are new entries required.
+=========+=================+
| Integer | Assertion Type |
+=========+=================+
| 0 | verified |
+---------+-----------------+
| 1 | logged |
+---------+-----------------+
| 2 | proximity |
+---------+-----------------+
| 3 | agent-proximity |
+---------+-----------------+
Table 2: CBOR integers
for the "assertion"
attribute enum
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7.5. Voucher Extensions
An unstated assumption in [RFC8366] was that vouchers could be
extended in proprietary ways by manufacturers. This allows for
manufacturers to communicate new things from the MASA to the Pledge,
and since both are under control of the same entity, it seemed
perfectly fine, even though it would violate the strict definition of
the YANG model.
The JSON serialization of vouchers implicitely accomodates the above,
since the voucher is just a map (or dictionary). Map keys are just
strings, and creating unique strings is easy to do by including the
manufacturer's domain name.
In CBOR serialization [RFC9254], the situation is not so easy. The
delta encoding for keys requires new keys to use the absolute Tag(47)
for new entities. An extension might need to use the Private Use SID
values, or acquire SID values for their own use.
Where the process has become complex is when making standard
extensions, as has happened recently, resulting in this document.
The processes which were anticipated to be useful, (the "augment"
mechanism) turned out not to be, see Section 5.1.
Instead, a process similiar to what was done by [RFC8520] has been
adopted. In this, extensions are listed in a leaf named
"extensions". In JSON serialization, these extensions require a
unique name, and this MUST be allocated by IANA. The name MUST be
the same as the YANG extension module name. The "extensions" list
attribute definied in this model allows for new standard extensions
to be defined. Items within that list are strings (in JSON
serialization), or integers (in CBOR serialization), as defined by
the Voucher Extension Registry.
Extensions are full YANG modules, which are subject to the SID
allocation process described in [RFC9254]. When an extension is
serialized, the extension is placed in a sub-map in the value
section. In JSON serialization, the key is the name of the
extension, prefixed by the string "extension:". In CBOR
serialization, the key is the SID which is allocated as the module
SID. This will typically require the absolute Tag(47) to be applied
to this key.
Note that this differs from the mechanism described in [RFC8520] in
that a sub-map is not used. Instead keys are created by combining
the module name and the attribute as a string. The [RFC8520]
mechanism uses more bytes, but is also not easily translateable to
CBOR.
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As the Voucher Request artifact is created by YANG augment of the
voucher artifact, any extension defined for the voucher is also valid
for a Voucher Request.
7.6. Manufacturer Private extensions
A manufacturer might need to communicate content in the voucher (or
in the voucher request), which are never subject to standardization.
While they can use the voucher extensions mechanism defined in
Section 7.5, it does require allocation of a SID in order to do
minimal-sized encoding. Note that [RFC9254] does not strictly
require use of SIDs: instead of a SID value, the full string name can
always be used. But this would significantly increase the size of
the voucher data.
Instead, a manufacturer MAY use the manufacturer-private leaf to put
any content they wish. In CBOR serialization, if a plain CBOR map
would be used, it would be subject to delta encoding: so use of this
leaf requires that the contents are bstr-encoded [RFC8949],
Section 3.1 (Major type 2). In JSON serialization, delta-encoding
does not get in the way, and the manufacturer MAY use any encoding
that is convenient for them, but base64URL encoding [RFC4648],
Section 5 is RECOMMENDED.
8. Voucher Request Artifact
[BRSKI], Section 3 defined a Voucher-Request Artifact as an augmented
artifact from the Voucher Artifact originally defined in [RFC8366].
That definition has been moved to this document, and translated from
YANG-DATA [RFC8040] to the SX:STRUCTURE extension [RFC8791].
8.1. Tree Diagram
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a voucher
request document. The notation used in this diagram is described in
[RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG
module in Section 8.2.
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module: ietf-voucher-request
structure voucher:
+-- voucher
+-- created-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- extensions* union
+-- manufacturer-private? binary
+-- assertion? enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- (pinning)?
| +--:(pinned-domain-cert)
| | +-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
| +--:(pinned-domain-pubk)
| | +-- pinned-domain-pubk? binary
| +--:(pinned-domain-pubk-sha256)
| +-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- last-renewal-date?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- (nonceless)?
| +--:(expires-on)
| | +-- expires-on?
| | yang:date-and-time
| +--:(nonce)
| +-- nonce? binary
+-- est-domain? ietf:uri
+-- additional-configuration-url? ietf:uri
+-- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary
+-- (registrar-identity)?
| +--:(proximity-registrar-cert)
| | +-- proximity-registrar-cert? binary
| +--:(proximity-registrar-pubk)
| | +-- proximity-registrar-pubk? binary
| +--:(proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256)
| +-- proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- agent-signed-data? binary
+-- agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert? binary
+-- agent-sign-cert? binary
8.2. "ietf-voucher-request" Module
The ietf-voucher-request YANG module is derived from the ietf-voucher
module.
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<CODE BEGINS>
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
module ietf-voucher-request {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request";
prefix vcr;
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx;
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix vch;
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher,
which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or
delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to
an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure
connection to the owner's network infrastructure";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Artifact for
Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Max Pritikin
<mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>
Author: Toerless Eckert
<mailto:tte@cs.fau.de>
Author: Qiufang Ma
<mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>";
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher request.
It is a superset of the voucher itself.
It provides content to the MASA for consideration
during a voucher request.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
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described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.
RFCEDITOR: please replace XXXX with the RFC number assigned.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2023-01-10 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure";
}
grouping voucher-request-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
uses vch:voucher-artifact-grouping {
refine "voucher/created-on" {
mandatory false;
}
refine "voucher/last-renewal-date" {
description
"A last-renewal-date field
is not valid in a voucher request, and
any occurrence MUST be ignored";
}
refine "voucher/domain-cert-revocation-checks" {
description
"The domain-cert-revocation-checks field
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is not valid in a voucher request, and
any occurrence MUST be ignored";
}
refine "voucher/assertion" {
mandatory false;
description
"Any assertion included in registrar voucher
requests SHOULD be ignored by the MASA.";
}
augment "voucher" {
description
"Adds leaf nodes appropriate for requesting vouchers.";
leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
type binary;
description
"If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and
forward a voucher that was previously provided along a
protocol path, then the previously signed voucher SHOULD
be included in this field.
For example, a pledge might sign a voucher request
with a proximity-registrar-cert, and the registrar
then includes it as the prior-signed-voucher-request
field. This is a simple mechanism for a chain of
trusted parties to change a voucher request, while
maintaining the prior signature information.
The Registrar and MASA MAY examine the prior signed
voucher information for the
purposes of policy decisions. For example this
information could be useful to a MASA to determine
that both pledge and registrar agree on proximity
assertions. The MASA SHOULD remove all
prior-signed-voucher-request information when
signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize
the final voucher size.";
}
choice registrar-identity {
description
"One of these three attributes will be used to pin the \
registrar identity";
leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by
RFC 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in [ITU.X690.1994].
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The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (the end-entity TLS
certificate, see [RFC8446]) presented by the Registrar
to the Pledge.
This MUST be populated in a Pledge's voucher request
when a proximity assertion is requested.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-pubk {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-pubk replaces
the proximity-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher-request.
The proximity-registrar-pubk is the
Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY, but due to
size is discouraged.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
is an alternative to both
proximity-registrar-pubk and pinned-domain-cert.
In many cases the public key of the domain has already
been transmitted during the key agreement protocol,
and it is wasteful to transmit the public key another
two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specification which may define a new leaf for another
hash type.";
}
}
leaf agent-signed-data {
type binary;
description
"The agent-signed-data field contains a data artifact \
provided
by the Registrar-Agent to the Pledge for inclusion \
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into the
voucher request.
This artifact is signed by the Registrar-Agent and \
contains
data, which can be verified by the pledge and the \
registrar.
This data contains the pledge's serial-number and a \
created-on
information of the agent-signed-data.
The format is intentionally defined as binary to allow
the document using this leaf to determine the encoding.\
";
}
leaf agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU X.690.
The first certificate in the registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (the end-entity TLS
certificate; see RFC 8446) presented by the
registrar to the registrar-agent and provided to
the pledge.
This MUST be populated in a pledge's voucher-request
when an agent-proximity assertion is requested.";
reference
"ITU X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)
RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile
RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.3";
}
leaf agent-sign-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU X.690.
This certificate can be used by the pledge,
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the registrar, and the MASA to verify the signature
of agent-signed-data. It is an optional component
for the pledge-voucher request.
This MUST be populated in a registrar's
voucher-request when an agent-proximity assertion
is requested.";
reference
"ITU X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)
RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile";
}
}
}
}
// Top-level statement
sx:structure voucher {
uses voucher-request-grouping;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
8.3. ietf-voucher-request SID values
[RFC9254] explains how to serialize YANG into CBOR, and for this a
series of SID values are required. While [CORESID] defines the
management process for these values, due to the immaturity of the
tooling around this YANG-SID mechanisms, the following values are
considered normative.
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SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2501 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/voucher
2502 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/voucher/assertion
2503 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/voucher/created-on
2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2505 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/voucher/expires-on
2506 data .../idevid-issuer
2507 data .../last-renewal-date
2508 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/nonce
2509 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request
2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert
2512 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
2513 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk
2514 data .../serial-number
2515 data .../agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert
2516 data .../agent-sign-cert
2517 data .../agent-signed-data
2518 data .../pinned-domain-pubk
2519 data .../pinned-domain-pubk-sha256
2520 data .../additional-configuration-url
2521 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/est-domain
2522 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/expires-on
2523 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/voucher/extensions
2524 data .../manufacturer-private
The "assertion" attribute is an enumerated type, and has values as
defined in Table 2.
9. Design Considerations
9.1. Renewals Instead of Revocations
The lifetimes of vouchers may vary. In some onboarding protocols,
the vouchers may be created and consumed immediately, whereas in
other onboarding solutions, there may be a significant time delay
between when a voucher is created and when it is consumed. In cases
when there is a time delay, there is a need for the Pledge to ensure
that the assertions made when the voucher was created are still
valid.
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A revocation artifact is generally used to verify the continued
validity of an assertion such as a PKIX certificate, web token, or a
"voucher". With this approach, a potentially long-lived assertion is
paired with a reasonably fresh revocation status check to ensure that
the assertion is still valid. However, this approach increases
solution complexity, as it introduces the need for additional
protocols and code paths to distribute and process the revocations.
Addressing the shortcomings of revocations, this document recommends
instead the use of lightweight renewals of short-lived non-revocable
vouchers. That is, rather than issue a long-lived voucher, where the
'expires-on' leaf is set to some distant date, the expectation is for
the MASA to instead issue a short-lived voucher, where the 'expires-
on' leaf is set to a relatively near date, along with a promise
(reflected in the 'last-renewal-date' field) to reissue the voucher
again when needed. Importantly, while issuing the initial voucher
may incur heavyweight verification checks ("Are you who you say you
are?" "Does the Pledge actually belong to you?"), reissuing the
voucher should be a lightweight process, as it ostensibly only
updates the voucher's validity period. With this approach, there is
only the one artifact, and only one code path is needed to process
it; there is no possibility of a Pledge choosing to skip the
revocation status check because, for instance, the OCSP Responder is
not reachable.
While this document recommends issuing short-lived vouchers, the
voucher artifact does not restrict the ability to create long-lived
voucher, if required; however, no revocation method is described.
Note that a voucher may be signed by a chain of intermediate CAs
leading up to the trust anchor CA known by the Pledge. Even though
the voucher itself is not revocable, it is still revoked, per se, if
one of the intermediate CA certificates is revoked.
9.2. Voucher Per Pledge
The solution described herein originally enabled a single voucher to
apply to many Pledges, using lists of regular expressions to
represent ranges of serial-numbers. However, it was determined that
blocking the renewal of a voucher that applied to many devices would
be excessive when only the ownership for a single Pledge needed to be
blocked. Thus, the voucher format now only supports a single serial-
number to be listed.
10. Security Considerations
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10.1. Clock Sensitivity
An attacker could use an expired voucher to gain control over a
device that has no understanding of time. The device cannot trust
NTP as a time reference, as an attacker could control the NTP stream.
There are three things to defend against this: 1) devices are
required to verify that the expires-on field has not yet passed, 2)
devices without access to time can use nonces to get ephemeral
vouchers, and 3) vouchers without expiration times may be used, which
will appear in the audit log, informing the security decision.
This document defines a voucher format that contains time values for
expirations, which require an accurate clock in order to be processed
correctly. Vendors planning on issuing vouchers with expiration
values must ensure that devices have an accurate clock when shipped
from manufacturing facilities and take steps to prevent clock
tampering. If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy, then
vouchers with time values for expirations should not be issued.
10.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM
Pursuant the recommendation made in Section 6.1 for the MASA to be
deployed as an online voucher signing service, it is RECOMMENDED that
the MASA's private key used for signing vouchers is protected by a
hardware security module (HSM).
10.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing
If a domain certificate is compromised, then any outstanding vouchers
for that domain could be used by the attacker. In this case, the
domain administrator is clearly expected to initiate revocation of
any domain identity certificates (as is normal in PKI solutions).
Similarly, they are expected to contact the MASA to indicate that an
outstanding (presumably short lifetime) voucher should be blocked
from automated renewal. Protocols for voucher distribution are
RECOMMENDED to check for revocation of domain identity certificates
before the signing of vouchers.
10.4. YANG Module Security Considerations
The YANG modules specified in this document define the schema for
data that is subsequently encapsulated by secure signed-data
structure, such as the CMS signed-data described in Section 6.1. As
such, all of the YANG modeled data is protected from modification.
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Implementations should be aware that the signed data is only
protected from external modification; the data is still visible.
This potential disclosure of information doesn't affect security so
much as privacy. In particular, adversaries can glean information
such as which devices belong to which organizations and which CRL
Distribution Point and/or OCSP Responder URLs are accessed to
validate the vouchers. When privacy is important, the CMS signed-
data content type SHOULD be encrypted, either by conveying it via a
mutually authenticated secure transport protocol (e.g., TLS
[RFC5246]) or by encapsulating the signed-data content type with an
enveloped-data content type (Section 6 of [RFC5652]), though details
for how to do this are outside the scope of this document.
The use of YANG to define data structures, via the 'yang-data'
statement, is relatively new and distinct from the traditional use of
YANG to define an API accessed by network management protocols such
as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. For this reason, these
guidelines do not follow template described by Section 3.7 of
[YANG-GUIDE].
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers two URIs in the "IETF XML Registry"
[RFC3688].
IANA has registered the following:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher
Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This reference should be updated to point to this document.
11.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers two YANG module in the "YANG Module Names"
registry [RFC6020].
IANA has registred the following:
name: ietf-voucher
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher
prefix: vch
reference: RFC 8366
This reference should be updated to point to this document.
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11.3. The Media Types Registry
IANA has registered the media type: application/voucher-cms+json, and
this registration should be updated to point to this document.
11.4. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry
IANA has registered the OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.40, id-ct-
animaJSONVoucher. This registration should be updated to point to
this document.
11.5. Extensions Registry
IANA is asked to create a registry of extensions as follows:
Registry name: Voucher Extensions Registry
Registry policy: First Come First Served
Reference: an optional document
Extension name: UTF-8-encoded string, not to exceed 40 characters.
Extension SID: the module SID value as allocated
Each extension MUST follow the rules specified in this specification.
As is usual, the IANA issues early allocations in accordance with
[RFC7120].
Note that the SID module value is allocated as part of a [CORESID]
process. This may be from a SID range managed by IANA, or from any
other MegaRange. Future work may allow for PEN based allocations.
IANA does not need to separately allocate a SID value for this
column.
Extension name strings for standards track documents are single
words, given by the YANG Module Name. They do not contain dots. For
vendor proprietary extensions, the string SHOULD be made unique by
putting the extension name in the form a fully-qualified domain name
(FQDN) [RFC3696], such as "fuubar.example.com"
Vendor proprietary extensions do not need to be registered with IANA,
but vendors MAY do so.
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Designated Experts should review for standards track documents for
clarity, but the process is essentially tied to WG and IESG process:
There are no choices in the extension names (which is always the YANG
module name), or SID value (which is from another IANA process). For
non-standards track extensions, the Designated Expert should review
whatever document is provided, if any. The stability of the
reference may be of concern. The Designated Expert should determine
if the work overlaps with existing efforts; and if so suggest
merging. However, as registration is optional, the Designated Expert
should not block any registrations.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[BRSKI] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[CBOR] Internet Standard 94,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std94>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[cBRSKI] Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (cBRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-29, 18 October
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
anima-constrained-voucher-29>.
[CLOUD] Friel, O., Shekh-Yusef, R., and M. Richardson,
"Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)
Cloud Registrar", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-anima-brski-cloud-19, 9 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
brski-cloud-19>.
[CORESID] Veillette, M., Ed., Pelov, A., Ed., Petrov, I., Ed.,
Bormann, C., and M. Richardson, "YANG Schema Item
iDentifier (YANG SID)", RFC 9595, DOI 10.17487/RFC9595,
July 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9595>.
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[IDEVID] IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
2018, <https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ar/>.
[ITU-T.X690.2015]
International Telecommunication Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[jBRSKI] Werner, T. and M. Richardson, "JWS signed Voucher
Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16, 15
January 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16>.
[PRM] Fries, S., Werner, T., Lear, E., and M. Richardson, "BRSKI
with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-23, 3
June 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-anima-brski-prm-23>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
[RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7120>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7950>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7951>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8791] Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8791>.
[RFC9148] van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S.
Raza, "EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with
the Secure Constrained Application Protocol", RFC 9148,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9148, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9148>.
[RFC9254] Veillette, M., Ed., Petrov, I., Ed., Pelov, A., Bormann,
C., and M. Richardson, "Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG
in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",
RFC 9254, DOI 10.17487/RFC9254, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9254>.
[ZERO-TOUCH]
Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8572>.
12.2. Informative References
[COSE] Internet Standard 96,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std96>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Countersignatures", STD 96, RFC 9338,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9338, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338>.
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[fairhair] Open Connectivity Foundation, "Fairhair Specification", 1
November 2019,
<https://openconnectivity.org/developer/specifications/
fairhair/>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-authz]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., Vučinić, M., Fedrecheski,
G., and M. Richardson, "Lightweight Authorization using
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (ELA)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-authz-05, 7 July
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
lake-authz-05>.
[I-D.vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata]
Van Geest, D. and F. Strenzke, "Best Practices for CMS
SignedData with Regards to Signed Attributes", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-
cma-signeddata-02, 20 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vangeest-
lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata-02>.
[imprinting]
Wikipedia, "Wikipedia article: Imprinting (psychology)", 1
October 2025, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=Imprinting_(psychology)&oldid=1314466188>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3688>.
[RFC3696] Klensin, J., "Application Techniques for Checking and
Transformation of Names", RFC 3696, DOI 10.17487/RFC3696,
February 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3696>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
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[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7435>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8340>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[SECUREJOIN]
Richardson, M., "6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-6tisch-
dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-04, 8 July 2019,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-
dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-04>.
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[Stajano99theresurrecting]
Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The Resurrecting Duckling:
Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks", 1999, <http
s://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/www/files/publications/
public/files/tr.1999.2.pdf>.
[YANG-GUIDE]
Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8407>.
Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Key pairs associated with examples
The following voucher request has been produced using the IDevID
[IDEVID] public (certificate) and private key. They are included so
that other developers can match the same output.
The private RSA key:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIBHNh6r8QRevRuo+tEmBJeFjQKf6bpFA/9NGoltv+9sNoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEA6N1Q4ezfMAKmoecrfb0OBMc1AyEH+BATkF58FsTSyBxs0SbSWLx
FjDOuwB9gLGn2TsTUJumJ6VPw5Z/TP4hJw==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
The IDevID certificate (public key):
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The Certification Authority that created the IDevID:
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1016146354 (0x3c9129b2)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN = highway-test.example.com CA
Validity
Not Before: Apr 5 19:36:57 2021 GMT
Not After : May 6 05:36:57 2021 GMT
Subject: CN = highway-test.example.com CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (3072 bit)
Modulus:
00:b4:7b:27:42:49:9f:ed:85:47:74:ff:f6:50:cd:
5d:22:1a:64:38:22:f8:09:d2:d6:f3:60:d8:98:7f:
e5:84:52:1e:d9:ce:96:b4:dc:a6:43:74:67:27:d9:
9d:42:7d:bf:1a:43:92:9b:d1:dd:34:9b:41:d2:e3:
d5:59:b3:40:fc:b3:c9:e1:58:84:3f:87:f7:06:45:
25:26:4c:bf:a1:45:72:a0:0a:5b:86:41:d7:8e:be:
d3:38:b5:aa:66:69:bd:3a:fd:e9:b5:b8:a2:79:c4:
f0:a5:3c:9e:91:94:32:1e:9c:b0:7f:25:46:5b:76:
1d:86:23:85:b0:62:45:5c:a8:6f:fb:c5:26:e1:dd:
a8:f2:68:ab:c5:8c:b4:58:b4:2e:96:49:fa:fe:d2:
ea:a5:11:68:c2:8d:f4:58:ab:30:bd:dd:1b:29:97:
00:18:6f:59:40:9c:3a:2a:e4:96:25:bb:12:f4:1a:
11:72:6d:31:f6:b4:e1:cc:d8:9a:0c:aa:a8:aa:a4:
64:e3:f1:06:1c:c0:09:df:62:ba:04:cb:70:b0:c4:
f7:ca:35:22:ea:a9:c7:52:e1:ce:27:fb:6c:52:39:
b7:22:b3:5d:97:cb:0a:9f:75:a3:af:16:ef:e6:b2:
1b:6a:c3:0b:1d:15:fd:b8:d8:e7:8a:f6:f4:99:1c:
23:97:4b:80:e9:79:a3:85:16:f8:dd:bd:77:ef:3a:
3c:8e:e7:75:56:67:36:3a:dd:42:7b:84:2f:64:2f:
13:0e:fa:b0:3b:11:13:7e:ae:78:a6:2f:46:dd:4b:
11:88:e4:7b:19:ab:21:2d:1f:34:ba:61:cd:51:84:
a5:ec:6a:c1:90:20:70:e3:aa:f4:01:fd:0c:6e:cd:
04:47:99:31:70:79:6c:af:41:78:c1:04:2a:43:78:
84:8a:fe:c3:3d:f2:41:c8:2a:a1:10:e0:b7:b4:4f:
4e:e6:26:79:ac:49:64:cf:57:1e:2e:e3:2f:58:bd:
6f:30:00:67:d7:8b:d6:13:60:bf
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
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X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
33:12:45:B7:1B:10:BE:F3:CB:64:E5:4C:50:80:7C:9D:88:\
65:74:40
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
33:12:45:B7:1B:10:BE:F3:CB:64:E5:4C:50:80:7C:9D:88:\
65:74:40
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
05:37:28:85:37:39:71:87:ec:5c:f0:51:19:55:4a:b7:e0:2a:
e6:61:30:d4:e2:2b:ad:7a:db:12:fc:8a:a6:6e:15:82:80:10:
fa:5d:67:60:e8:54:14:e3:89:d6:4e:60:89:98:5b:ab:fe:32:
26:aa:02:35:68:4e:c6:2e:ce:08:36:d1:ea:a0:97:3d:76:38:
6e:9d:4b:6f:33:d2:fa:c2:7e:b0:59:bc:75:97:17:d1:1b:c5:
c4:58:ae:7b:7e:87:e5:87:2b:8b:6b:10:16:70:7c:c8:65:c7:
d0:62:5d:f3:b5:06:af:03:8b:32:dd:88:f0:07:2b:5d:61:58:
61:35:54:a6:ce:95:81:a2:6e:fa:b5:aa:25:e1:41:53:9d:e7:
4b:7e:93:88:79:6b:dd:a3:6e:9a:0d:bd:85:b4:2d:66:b9:cc:
01:13:f1:b5:d5:91:cc:86:5e:a7:c8:4a:8f:4d:9d:f8:17:31:
32:7d:50:d5:c2:79:a0:41:a0:69:83:33:16:14:35:26:10:3b:
23:eb:60:d9:28:68:99:d5:55:61:89:b5:35:5d:8b:fe:b1:96:
32:69:3e:8b:c2:a2:4e:e1:d8:76:04:3c:87:91:5d:66:9e:81:
a5:bf:18:2e:3e:39:da:4f:68:57:46:d2:1d:aa:81:51:3b:33:
72:da:e9:7d:12:b6:a1:fc:c7:1d:c1:9c:bd:92:e8:1b:d2:06:
e8:0b:82:2a:4f:23:5a:7a:fa:7b:86:a0:d7:c1:46:e7:04:47:
77:11:cd:da:7c:50:32:d2:6f:fd:1e:0a:df:cf:b1:20:d2:86:
ce:40:5a:27:61:49:2f:71:f5:04:ac:eb:c6:03:70:a4:70:13:
4a:af:41:35:83:dc:55:c0:29:7f:12:4f:d0:f1:bb:f7:61:4a:
9f:8d:61:b0:5e:89:46:49:e3:27:8b:42:82:5e:af:14:d5:d9:
91:69:3d:af:11:70:5b:a3:92:3b:e3:c8:2a:a4:38:e5:88:f2:
6f:09:f4:e5:04:3b
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIELTCCApWgAwIBAgIEPJEpsjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAmMSQwIgYDVQQDDBto
aWdod2F5LXRlc3QuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20gQ0EwHhcNMjEwNDA1MTkzNjU3WhcNMjEw
NTA2MDUzNjU3WjAmMSQwIgYDVQQDDBtoaWdod2F5LXRlc3QuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20g
Q0EwggGiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBjwAwggGKAoIBgQC0eydCSZ/thUd0//ZQ
zV0iGmQ4IvgJ0tbzYNiYf+WEUh7Zzpa03KZDdGcn2Z1Cfb8aQ5Kb0d00m0HS49VZ
s0D8s8nhWIQ/h/cGRSUmTL+hRXKgCluGQdeOvtM4tapmab06/em1uKJ5xPClPJ6R
lDIenLB/JUZbdh2GI4WwYkVcqG/7xSbh3ajyaKvFjLRYtC6WSfr+0uqlEWjCjfRY
qzC93RsplwAYb1lAnDoq5JYluxL0GhFybTH2tOHM2JoMqqiqpGTj8QYcwAnfYroE
y3CwxPfKNSLqqcdS4c4n+2xSObcis12XywqfdaOvFu/mshtqwwsdFf242OeK9vSZ
HCOXS4DpeaOFFvjdvXfvOjyO53VWZzY63UJ7hC9kLxMO+rA7ERN+rnimL0bdSxGI
5HsZqyEtHzS6Yc1RhKXsasGQIHDjqvQB/QxuzQRHmTFweWyvQXjBBCpDeISK/sM9
8kHIKqEQ4Le0T07mJnmsSWTPVx4u4y9YvW8wAGfXi9YTYL8CAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYD
VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFDMSRbcbEL7z
y2TlTFCAfJ2IZXRAMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFDMSRbcbEL7zy2TlTFCAfJ2IZXRAMA0G
CSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBgQAFNyiFNzlxh+xc8FEZVUq34CrmYTDU4iutetsS/Iqm
bhWCgBD6XWdg6FQU44nWTmCJmFur/jImqgI1aE7GLs4INtHqoJc9djhunUtvM9L6
wn6wWbx1lxfRG8XEWK57foflhyuLaxAWcHzIZcfQYl3ztQavA4sy3YjwBytdYVhh
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NVSmzpWBom76taol4UFTnedLfpOIeWvdo26aDb2FtC1mucwBE/G11ZHMhl6nyEqP
TZ34FzEyfVDVwnmgQaBpgzMWFDUmEDsj62DZKGiZ1VVhibU1XYv+sZYyaT6LwqJO
4dh2BDyHkV1mnoGlvxguPjnaT2hXRtIdqoFROzNy2ul9Erah/McdwZy9kugb0gbo
C4IqTyNaevp7hqDXwUbnBEd3Ec3afFAy0m/9Hgrfz7Eg0obOQFonYUkvcfUErOvG
A3CkcBNKr0E1g9xVwCl/Ek/Q8bv3YUqfjWGwXolGSeMni0KCXq8U1dmRaT2vEXBb
o5I748gqpDjliPJvCfTlBDs=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The private key for the Certification Authority that created the
IDevID:
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-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
The MASA certificate that signs the voucher:
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBcDCB9qADAgECAgQLhwoxMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCYxJDAiBgNVBAMMG2hpZ2h3
YXktdGVzdC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSBDQTAeFw0yMTA0MTMyMTQwMTZaFw0yMzA0MTMy
MTQwMTZaMCgxJjAkBgNVBAMMHWhpZ2h3YXktdGVzdC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSBNQVNB
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrps
qbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpaMQMA4w
DAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNpADBmAjEArsthLdRcjW6GqgsGHcbT
YLoyczYl0yOFSYcczpQjeRqeQVUkHRUioUi7CsCrPBNzAjEAhjxns5Wi4uX5rfkd
nME0Mnj1z+rVRwOfAL/QWctRwpgEgSSKURNQsXWyL52otPS5
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The private key for MASA certificate signs the voucher:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFhdd0eDdzip67kXx72K+KHGJQYJHNy8pkiLJ6CcvxMGoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrpsqbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+
gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. Example CMS signed voucher request
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MIIGjQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGfjCCBnoCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggOl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A.3. Example CMS signed voucher from MASA
Watsen, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2025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A.4. Example JWS signed voucher from MASA
These examples are folded according to the [RFC8792] Single Backslash
rule.
Watsen, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2025
{
"payload": "eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJwcm\
94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiY2FmZmUtOTg3NDUiLCJub25jZSI6IjYyYT\
JlNzY5M2Q4MmZjZGEyNjI0ZGU1OGZiNjcyMmU1IiwiY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjUtMT\
AtMTVUMDA6MDA6MDBaIiwicGlubmVkLWRvbWFpbi1jZXJ0IjoiTUlJQmd6Q0NBU3FnQX\
dJQkFnSUdBV09XZTBSRk1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRFV4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNV\
FuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTkJnTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUk\
RRVEFlRncweE9EQTFNalV3T0RRM016QmFGdzB5T0RBMU1qVXdPRFEzTXpCYU1EVXhFek\
FSQmdOVkJBb01DazE1UW5WemFXNWxjM014RFRBTEJnTlZCQWNNQkZOcGRHVXhEekFOQm\
dOVkJBTU1CbFJsYzNSRFFUQlpNQk1HQnlxR1NNNDlBZ0VHQ0NxR1NNNDlBd0VIQTBJQU\
JIOUVCdXVXVjdJS09ya040YjdsYTVJb2J5dFduV1p3Rm5QdHVsMDlhd3dVSEZQZStOWW\
M1WjVwdUo2ZEFuK0FrVzFnY1poQlhWR0JBM0crSXlSV1VXU2pKakFrTUJJR0ExVWRFd0\
VCL3dRSU1BWUJBZjhDQVFBd0RnWURWUjBQQVFIL0JBUURBZ0lFTUFvR0NDcUdTTTQ5Qk\
FNQ0EwY0FNRVFDSURlWlc2SWZjeUsvLzBBVFk2S21NYjRNMFFJU1FTZFVGVjdQNzlLWV\
ZJWVVBaUJRMVYrd0xSM1Uzd2NJWnhHSE1ISGx0N2M3ZzFDaFdNRVkveEFoU1NZaWlnPT\
0ifX0",
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmNEQ0I5cUFEQWdFQ0FnUUxod294TUFv\
R0NDcUdTTTQ5QkFNQ01DWXhKREFpQmdOVkJBTU1HMmhwWjJoM1lYa3RkR1Z6ZEM1bGVH\
RnRjR3hsTG1OdmJTQkRRVEFlRncweU1UQTBNVE15TVRRd01UWmFGdzB5TXpBME1UTXlN\
VFF3TVRaYU1DZ3hKakFrQmdOVkJBTU1IV2hwWjJoM1lYa3RkR1Z6ZEM1bGVHRnRjR3hs\
TG1OdmJTQk5RVk5CTUZrd0V3WUhLb1pJemowQ0FRWUlLb1pJemowREFRY0RRZ0FFcWdR\
Vm8wUzU0a1Q0eWZrYkJ4dW1kSE9jSHJwc3FiT3BNS21pTWxuM29CMUhBVzI1TUpWK2dx\
aTR0TUZmU0owaUV3dDhrc3pmV1hLNHJMZ0pTMm1ucGFNUU1BNHdEQVlEVlIwVEFRSC9C\
QUl3QURBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFnTnBBREJtQWpFQXJzdGhMZFJjalc2R3Fnc0dIY2JU\
WUxveWN6WWwweU9GU1ljY3pwUWplUnFlUVZVa0hSVWlvVWk3Q3NDclBCTnpBakVBaGp4\
bnM1V2k0dVg1cmZrZG5NRTBNbmoxeityVlJ3T2ZBTC9RV2N0UndwZ0VnU1NLVVJOUXNY\
V3lMNTJvdFBTNSJdLCJ0eXAiOiJ2b3VjaGVyLWp3cytqc29uIiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYi\
fQ",
"signature": "s_gJM_4qzz1bxDtqh6Ybip42J_0_Y4CMdrMFb8lpPsAhDHVR\
AESNRL3n6M_F8dGQHm1fu66x83cK9E5cPtEdag"
}
]
}
Figure 1: Example JWS Voucher
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): William Atwood,
Michael H. Behringer, Esko Dijk, Steffen Fries, Sheng Jiang, Thomas
Werner.
Authors' Addresses
Watsen, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2025
Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks
Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0773-8388
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Max Pritikin
Cisco Systems
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Toerless Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc.
2330 Central Expy
Santa Clara, 95050
United States of America
Email: tte@cs.fau.de
Qiufang Ma
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing
210012
China
Email: maqiufang1@huawei.com
Watsen, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 51]